Thanks to a 22-10 stretch that began in June, the Royals (44-43) are right back in the thick of the American League playoff race. They are three games behind the Indians (47-40) in the Central and just a 1 1/2 behind the Rays for the second wild card spot at the All-Star Break.
The Royals begin the second half with a 10-game home stand beginning Friday with an important three-game series at Kauffman Stadium against a fellow wild-card contender in the Rangers. Ahead of that, I have five bold predictions for the Royals' second half.
1) Alex Gordon Will Have a Big Second Half
It's no secret, the team's franchise player, fan favorite, and most expensive salary on the roster has been a bust in the first year-and-a-half of his four-year contract. While the rest of the Royals' core is performing fairly well (Lorenzo Cain 2.7 bWAR; Eric Hosmer 2.2 bWAR; Sal Perez 1.9 bWAR; Mike Moustakas 1.3 bWAR) Gordon has been one of the worst hitters in baseball through the first half, posting just a .592 OPS. He has, however, maintained his excellent defense in left field, which like Alcides Escobar, has made him somewhat playable.
Call me stubborn, but I refuse to believe Gordon has fallen off a cliff offensively at age 33. Gordon hit .184/.268/.218 in April and .164/.307/.192 in May. The best explanation for that dreadful production was his sudden propensity to hit the ball on the ground. He had a 53.2 percent groundball rate to that point; by far the highest of his career. Gordon has provided some reason for optimism since. While he's still not seeing his batting average improve (.195 for the season) he's hit for more pop lately, as he had a .731 OPS in June. Look no further than his lowered groundball rate, which now sits at 44.8 percent. Still a career high, but much closer in line with his career performance.
Despite cutting down on his groundball rate, his BABIP still remains incredibly low at .234. Some of that is bad luck, while some of it is still his awful early-season performance baked in. Gordon is still walking at a decent rate (9%) and he's cut down on his strikeouts significantly from last season.
The All-Star break is a chance for players to step away from the game mentally and physically to recharge their batteries and prepare for the dog days of summer with what feels like a clean slate. Gordon feels like the guy who could benefit the most from this and he carried some positive momentum into the break. Gordon has too much of a track record and has too many core (literally and figuratively-- ABS BABY!) abilities to be mired in failure. I expect to see a big second half from A1, which would obviously be incredibly beneficial for the Royals.
2) Jorge Soler Will Make a Positive Impact
The Wade Davis-for-Jorge Soler trade has been harshly criticized through the first half of the season. Davis has been back to his old self as a reliever while Soler spent the better part of the first half in AAA and hasn't hit when he's been up with the big club. The disappointment of Soler has been largely cancelled out by the surprise emergence of Jorge Bonifacio, who has a .770 OPS and has performed admirably at the top of the lineup. Soler has a .537 OPS but that's in just 99 plate appearances. Three seasons ago as a 22-year old rookie for the Cubs, in 97 plate appearances he had a .903 OPS. Suffice to say, the real Soler lies somewhere in between the two extremes. Because of Bonifacio's steady play, Soler has been reduced to a platoon player, which isn't where many saw him before the season, but it doesn't mean he can't still be valuable.
If used properly, Soler should garner somewhere in the neighborhood of 300 plate appearances this season. He can be used at DH, Brandon Moss isn't hitting either. He can spell Bonifacio and he can give Alex Gordon and Lorenzo Cain time off in the outfield; they both will need it. And he can be a dangerous bat off the bench in late-game situations. For all the Royals have been good at over the course of this four-year run, they've never had a power bat like Soler on the bench. A guy who can change the game with one swing, but also posesses the plate discipline to draw a walk. It's year one of what will likely be four years for Soler in Kansas City and so far he's underwhelmed. That doesn't mean he can't add significant value the rest of the way as he finds his role. I'm betting he provides a few more smiles for fans the second half of the season.
3) Dayton Moore will make a significant trade
OK, this one isn't exactly a bold stance. Obviously, Moore will add a piece, or two, to this roster. Most likely in the form of a starting pitcher and reliever, but another bat could be necessary as well. Moore doesn't have the farm system to pull off a Johnny Cueto or Ben Zobrist-type deal, unless he's willing to part ways with Raul Mondesi, which by all indications, he is not. I predict what the Royals add will fall somewhere in between their 2014 (Jason Frasor and Josh WIlmington) and 2015 acquisitions. While some would suggest waiting until the next couple weeks play out, I think the Royals have proven themselves a contender in a muddled AL race. Thus, the sooner a play is made for an impact player, the better off the team will be. I'd look for Moore to get something significant done within the next week.
4) Jason Vargas will regress to the mean
Not everything on this list can be positive. And this one isn't exactly a bold prediction either. Vargas has pitched well above his career norms this season and there's very little in the way of peripheral evidence to backup what he's doing. If Vargas is nothing more than what he's been his whole career for the rest of the season, he'll still be worth roughly three wins to the Royals, which is incredibly valuable. Vargas has been worth two wins already by fWAR and has a 2.62 ERA despite just a 6.60 strikeout rate and 2.12 walk rate. Neither of which, by the way, is unusual compared to the rest of his career. The 2.62 ERA, however, is. His xFIP labels him with a 4.77 ERA, much more in line with his career norms. Thus, it is highly likely he will not maintain his low ERA throughout the course of the season. However, there is something to the type of weak contact Vargas seems to be able to induce. He can't keep his sub-3 ERA with his K/BB ratio, but he can remain an extremely valuable starter for the Royals.
5) Kelvin Herrera will regain cyborg status
Of everything that has occurred this season, Kelvin Herrera being bad is by far the strangest development. If you asked me before the season if I had a choice of keeping one out of Wade Davis, Greg Holland or Herrera, I would've chosen Herrera. Despite the fact he's the cheapest of the three, he'd also been the best of the three most recently and the most reliable, as both Davis and Holland had obvious red flags injury wise. From the jump this season, Herrera's strikeout rate was a concern. While it's improved over the past month, he simply wasn't missing bats because of his inability to locate his offspeed pitches. He throws 98-100 MPH, but when a professional hitter knows a fastball is coming, they're going to hit it and hit it hard. That was the first two months of Herrera's season, in summary.
He seems to have figured out whatever was plaguing his changeup early on in the season, though the devastating slider he debuted last season is still MIA. Essentially, he's reverted back to the 2013 version of himself, which was a HR/FB disaster, with less ability to miss bats. Herrera, however, has been better than his 4.50 ERA would indicate. He has an xFIP of 3.80 and his 2.99 BABIP is currently a career high. He still possesses way above average stuff and has shown signs of putting it all together as the Royals entered the break. I'd expect for him to return to form, albeit not 2014-15 form when he just stopped giving up home runs and struck out everyone, but something that somewhat resembles that.
Thursday, July 13, 2017
Tuesday, June 27, 2017
Royals Making a Push
At 37-37 the Royals find themselves in an interesting predicament. Thanks to the middling performance of the Indians, the overwhelming favorite in the American League Central, the Royals are just two games back in the division and in third place, 1.5 games behind the Twins, who have a -42 run differential.
The Royals are in the midst of their best stretch of baseball this season and have climbed all the way out of the 10-20 hole they put themselves in to start the season.
With the All-Star break just two weeks away and the trade deadline just two weeks beyond that, GM Dayton Moore will almost certainly have to navigate the thin line between trying to contend while also not mortgaging the club's future beyond this year.
I've gone back and forth on this several times since January. I advocated that the Royals give it one last run with this group of players, thus I was largely satisfied with the offseason's transactions. Then came the disastrous 10-20 start which had me reevaluating things and moving toward the "sell everyone and accelerate the rebuild" camp. They've gone 27-17 since, including a 15-7 record in the month of June.
The team was never as bad as it looked in April. They were hitting below .200 with runners in scoring position and had an abysmal BABIP, so regression to the mean was expected. But that's also what made the inauspicious start particularly damaging. The Royals, despite their improved play, still possess a poor run differential of -38. And while they're on an upward trajectory, the margin for error remains slim.
A bad week could tilt the scales back the other way.
For me to fully buy into this team's playoff chances, they need to play their way to five or six games above .500 and remain in the thick of the AL Central race -- a game or two out preferably. It's simply not worth the risk to receive nothing in the way of prospects for impending free agents Lorenzo Cain, Mike Moustakas, Jason Vargas and Eric Hosmer at a statistical long shot.
Then again, this team has always defied the odds.
The Royals have plenty of important games ahead of them, however, their next six are of particular significance. They travel to Detroit for three games with the Tigers beginning tonight and then return back home for a three-game series with the Twins, who have had their number so far. Go 5-1 with a sweep of the Twins and you're sitting at 42-38, likely just a game out or tied for the lead in the division with the calendar turned to July.
At that point, it's time to consider adding some pieces to this team. While I don't expect, or advise that Moore takes the 2015 route of adding big fish like Johnny Cueto and Ben Zobrist, which cost plenty in the way of prospects, I do think some modest upgrades to the bullpen and the infield, should be explored. There are also some potential in-house solutions available as well. Kyle Zimmer, if his arm is still attached, could provide an interesting bullpen option. Jorge Soler has a 1.127 OPS in 30 games at Omaha amidst DH Brandon Moss's continued struggles.
The Royals are at the tailend of a the best stretch of baseball the city has seen in three decades. An entire generation grew up without this. I'm in that generation. In 2008 I would've killed for meaningful baseball past the All-Star break. What the franchise has delivered 2013-16 has been a lot of fun. If the Royals are in the thick of playoff contention come the All-Star break, as outlined by the terms above, they owe it to themselves and the fan base to see it through.
I for one am rooting for one last ride with this group.
The Royals are in the midst of their best stretch of baseball this season and have climbed all the way out of the 10-20 hole they put themselves in to start the season.
With the All-Star break just two weeks away and the trade deadline just two weeks beyond that, GM Dayton Moore will almost certainly have to navigate the thin line between trying to contend while also not mortgaging the club's future beyond this year.
I've gone back and forth on this several times since January. I advocated that the Royals give it one last run with this group of players, thus I was largely satisfied with the offseason's transactions. Then came the disastrous 10-20 start which had me reevaluating things and moving toward the "sell everyone and accelerate the rebuild" camp. They've gone 27-17 since, including a 15-7 record in the month of June.
The team was never as bad as it looked in April. They were hitting below .200 with runners in scoring position and had an abysmal BABIP, so regression to the mean was expected. But that's also what made the inauspicious start particularly damaging. The Royals, despite their improved play, still possess a poor run differential of -38. And while they're on an upward trajectory, the margin for error remains slim.
A bad week could tilt the scales back the other way.
For me to fully buy into this team's playoff chances, they need to play their way to five or six games above .500 and remain in the thick of the AL Central race -- a game or two out preferably. It's simply not worth the risk to receive nothing in the way of prospects for impending free agents Lorenzo Cain, Mike Moustakas, Jason Vargas and Eric Hosmer at a statistical long shot.
Then again, this team has always defied the odds.
The Royals have plenty of important games ahead of them, however, their next six are of particular significance. They travel to Detroit for three games with the Tigers beginning tonight and then return back home for a three-game series with the Twins, who have had their number so far. Go 5-1 with a sweep of the Twins and you're sitting at 42-38, likely just a game out or tied for the lead in the division with the calendar turned to July.
At that point, it's time to consider adding some pieces to this team. While I don't expect, or advise that Moore takes the 2015 route of adding big fish like Johnny Cueto and Ben Zobrist, which cost plenty in the way of prospects, I do think some modest upgrades to the bullpen and the infield, should be explored. There are also some potential in-house solutions available as well. Kyle Zimmer, if his arm is still attached, could provide an interesting bullpen option. Jorge Soler has a 1.127 OPS in 30 games at Omaha amidst DH Brandon Moss's continued struggles.
The Royals are at the tailend of a the best stretch of baseball the city has seen in three decades. An entire generation grew up without this. I'm in that generation. In 2008 I would've killed for meaningful baseball past the All-Star break. What the franchise has delivered 2013-16 has been a lot of fun. If the Royals are in the thick of playoff contention come the All-Star break, as outlined by the terms above, they owe it to themselves and the fan base to see it through.
I for one am rooting for one last ride with this group.
Tuesday, May 23, 2017
Doubles Reported Missing From Royals Offense
As I'm sure you've noticed by now, the Kansas City Royals offense is quite awful. The Royals are last in the American League in runs with 147, which is the main reason why they are the not-so-proud owners of an 18-26 record and currently occupy the AL Central cellar.
This isn't a particularly new development for the Royals. With the exception of their World Series team in 2015, the current makeup of the club has always ranked near the bottom of the league in runs scored. They've made up for that with some good timely hitting, decent starting pitching, phenomenal defense and an otherworldly bullpen.
The Royals no longer have a phenomenal defense, merely a good one. They no longer have an otherworldly bullpen, merely an average one. So here we are.
I'm not interested in discussing all of that, however. I'm interested in delving into what exactly is plaguing this year's version of the offense. In years past, the Royals have possessed one elite skill in the offensive department: their ability to make contact.
Through 44 games this season, the Royals rank dead last in batting average (.230) and are fifth in strikeouts with 333. Those are both a serious departure from where they were even last season.
Where the Royals have always lagged is walks and home runs. They're still poor at drawing walks, ranking second-to-last in that department with 116. But they're actually on pace for their best home-run season in franchise history. As it stands now, they've hit 48 home runs and rank ninth in the league in that category. The club record is 168; they're on pace for 178.
So home runs are up and, while only slightly, so are the walks. So why on earth is this offense tracking to be the worst one of the Dayton Moore era?
-------
I was watching the Royals' series against the Twins over the weekend and a thought popped into my head as the Royals clubbed four home runs in a 6-4 win over the Twins in the first game of Sunday's doubleheader.
"It seems like there are only three results when this team puts the ball in play: an out, a single or a home run."
This thought struck me. And I tried to think back and recall games this season in which the Royals had multiple extra-base hits that weren't home runs. Surely this had occurred a few times this season, right? Answer: Yes, 14 times to be exact. They have seven games in which they've had two non-HR extra-base hits, six in which they've had three and one game in which they've had four.
Nevertheless, it was alarming to me that I couldn't think of an occurrence off the top of my head.
So I took a look at their doubles totals this season, a staple of their decent offensive teams in recent years. The numbers backed up my inclination. The Royals have hit just 52 doubles in 44 games, ranking them dead last by a wide margin in the league. They've also hit just three triples, ranking them third-to-last in the league.
What exacerbates this data is the ball park the Royals play in. Kauffman Stadium's cavernous outfield is conducive to extra-base hits. The 2011 Royals were the best at exploiting this. That team finished sixth in the league in runs and hit just 129 home runs (11th in the AL). But they hit 325 doubles, which ranked second in the league. The 2012 team took a step back offensively, but was still third in the league in doubles with 295. The 2013 team was bad at everything offensively. They ranked last in home runs, 12th in doubles and 11th in runs. (The firing of hitting coach Kevin Seitzer, who preached a line-drive and gap approach, coincidentally lines up with this decline).
The 2014 Royals were one of the worst home-run hitting teams in the modern era, managing just 95 long balls, but they were ninth in runs because they hit 286 doubles, which was fourth in the league. And the 2015 Royals finally recaptured the 2011 offensive approach and finished sixth in runs, third in doubles with 300 and fourth in triples with 42.
The 2017 Royals are on pace to hit just 137 doubles. It would, quite obviously, be by far their worst mark in franchise history. Even the 1969 Royals, who scored an abysmal 586 runs, hit 179 doubles.
It's difficult to suss out what exactly the root cause is for this sudden doubles departure. At 44 games, the sample size is too large to brush it off as just a statistical anomaly that will correct itself. The most simple explanation is this team is putting the ball in play less frequently than it has in recent seasons. As was mentioned earlier, their strikeouts are up at 20.6 percent, compared to about 16 percent in 2014-15, and hits are down.
With more balls in play, one would expect the doubles total to rise. But by how much? If anything, it might point to a basic flaw in the team's overall hitting approach, which combined with the aging curve this crop of players is experiencing, has led to subpar results.
The Royals will almost certainly never have an offense that ranks in the top two or three in the league. They don't have the payroll or the ballpark for it and they seemingly have never had the ability to draft and develop the players to make up for those two things. But what has made their offense viable in this most recent run of success is their ability to use the ballpark to their advantage by employing a line-drive hitting approach that hits gaps and allows their young legs to take advantage of it.
The Royals are no longer young. And while their home-run power is experiencing an uptick, it does not appear to be the best path for them to take toward success if it means sacrificing putting the ball in play.
These are important things for the front office to consider with an inevitable rebuild looming.
This isn't a particularly new development for the Royals. With the exception of their World Series team in 2015, the current makeup of the club has always ranked near the bottom of the league in runs scored. They've made up for that with some good timely hitting, decent starting pitching, phenomenal defense and an otherworldly bullpen.
The Royals no longer have a phenomenal defense, merely a good one. They no longer have an otherworldly bullpen, merely an average one. So here we are.
I'm not interested in discussing all of that, however. I'm interested in delving into what exactly is plaguing this year's version of the offense. In years past, the Royals have possessed one elite skill in the offensive department: their ability to make contact.
Through 44 games this season, the Royals rank dead last in batting average (.230) and are fifth in strikeouts with 333. Those are both a serious departure from where they were even last season.
Where the Royals have always lagged is walks and home runs. They're still poor at drawing walks, ranking second-to-last in that department with 116. But they're actually on pace for their best home-run season in franchise history. As it stands now, they've hit 48 home runs and rank ninth in the league in that category. The club record is 168; they're on pace for 178.
So home runs are up and, while only slightly, so are the walks. So why on earth is this offense tracking to be the worst one of the Dayton Moore era?
-------
I was watching the Royals' series against the Twins over the weekend and a thought popped into my head as the Royals clubbed four home runs in a 6-4 win over the Twins in the first game of Sunday's doubleheader.
"It seems like there are only three results when this team puts the ball in play: an out, a single or a home run."
This thought struck me. And I tried to think back and recall games this season in which the Royals had multiple extra-base hits that weren't home runs. Surely this had occurred a few times this season, right? Answer: Yes, 14 times to be exact. They have seven games in which they've had two non-HR extra-base hits, six in which they've had three and one game in which they've had four.
Nevertheless, it was alarming to me that I couldn't think of an occurrence off the top of my head.
So I took a look at their doubles totals this season, a staple of their decent offensive teams in recent years. The numbers backed up my inclination. The Royals have hit just 52 doubles in 44 games, ranking them dead last by a wide margin in the league. They've also hit just three triples, ranking them third-to-last in the league.
What exacerbates this data is the ball park the Royals play in. Kauffman Stadium's cavernous outfield is conducive to extra-base hits. The 2011 Royals were the best at exploiting this. That team finished sixth in the league in runs and hit just 129 home runs (11th in the AL). But they hit 325 doubles, which ranked second in the league. The 2012 team took a step back offensively, but was still third in the league in doubles with 295. The 2013 team was bad at everything offensively. They ranked last in home runs, 12th in doubles and 11th in runs. (The firing of hitting coach Kevin Seitzer, who preached a line-drive and gap approach, coincidentally lines up with this decline).
The 2014 Royals were one of the worst home-run hitting teams in the modern era, managing just 95 long balls, but they were ninth in runs because they hit 286 doubles, which was fourth in the league. And the 2015 Royals finally recaptured the 2011 offensive approach and finished sixth in runs, third in doubles with 300 and fourth in triples with 42.
The 2017 Royals are on pace to hit just 137 doubles. It would, quite obviously, be by far their worst mark in franchise history. Even the 1969 Royals, who scored an abysmal 586 runs, hit 179 doubles.
It's difficult to suss out what exactly the root cause is for this sudden doubles departure. At 44 games, the sample size is too large to brush it off as just a statistical anomaly that will correct itself. The most simple explanation is this team is putting the ball in play less frequently than it has in recent seasons. As was mentioned earlier, their strikeouts are up at 20.6 percent, compared to about 16 percent in 2014-15, and hits are down.
With more balls in play, one would expect the doubles total to rise. But by how much? If anything, it might point to a basic flaw in the team's overall hitting approach, which combined with the aging curve this crop of players is experiencing, has led to subpar results.
The Royals will almost certainly never have an offense that ranks in the top two or three in the league. They don't have the payroll or the ballpark for it and they seemingly have never had the ability to draft and develop the players to make up for those two things. But what has made their offense viable in this most recent run of success is their ability to use the ballpark to their advantage by employing a line-drive hitting approach that hits gaps and allows their young legs to take advantage of it.
The Royals are no longer young. And while their home-run power is experiencing an uptick, it does not appear to be the best path for them to take toward success if it means sacrificing putting the ball in play.
These are important things for the front office to consider with an inevitable rebuild looming.
Monday, May 15, 2017
Is Alex Gordon Done?
The Kansas City Royals are fresh off a sweep of the Baltimore Orioles over the weekend and are all of the sudden one of the hottest teams in baseball, having won six of seven. Yet, they remain in last place in the division and tied for the worst record in the American League at 16-21 while also possessing an ugly -37 run differential.
The question of whether the Royals should stay the course as a contender or have a fire sale will linger for the next month or so and will hinge, obviously, on the club's performance over that stretch.
Amidst all of this, a disturbing storyline has persisted. Alex Gordon, the team's highest-paid player, fan favorite and starting left fielder is lost at the plate. In 35 games he's hitting .152 with a .264 on-base percentage and a .192 slugging percentage. He is, quite simply, the worst hitter in baseball currently.
Gordon's sudden demise at the plate is perplexing to say the least. It's quite common for a hitter to decline once he reaches his early 30s and Gordon is 33. But there are very few examples of a player of Gordon's stature falling off a cliff like this.
Gordon's best season came in 2011 at age 27 when he hit .303/.376/.502. From 2011-2015 he was one of the best 10 players in baseball as measured by bWAR; though he's never again approached that .500 slugging percentage mark. During that five-year span Gordon settled in as about an .800 OPS guy who played Gold Glove defense in left field. He was the team's best player.
He showed zero signs of slowing down in his age 31 season in 2015 and, in fact, was tracking toward his best year since 2011 before going down with a nasty groin injury that caused him to miss about two months of the season. He still posted a career-high OBP season (.377) and had an OPS of .809. The Royals won a World Series, one which Gordon was a hero in, and in the offseason the club signed him to a franchise-record 4-year $72 million deal.
It has all gone awry since.
Playing against the White Sox in May Gordon collided with third baseman Mike Moustakas while going after a foul ball in what was the seminal moment of the season that was riddled with injuries to key players. Gordon broke his hand and missed six weeks. Moustakas tore his ACL and missed the rest of the season.
It was May 22 and Gordon was hitting .211/.319/.331. Not good, but it could simply be deemed a slow start and one that could be recovered from over the course of a full season. Gordon finished with a line .220/.312/.380. He had a .649 OPS in July, essentially his first full month back, and then showed signs of putting it all together in August when he hit .265/.348/.510. A bad September lowered his season totals. Gordon was actually right in line, given the time missed, with his career averages in home runs with 17. However, he was far below his extra-base hits totals.
I for one chalked up his poor season to nothing more than some misfortune. I felt his slow start was exacerbated by the injury and it was essentially a lost season. Not what you want from a guy making $16M a year on a small-market club, but understandable and nothing too alarming, although he did have a career high strikeout rate of 29.2 percent.
Ultimately, I was confident Gordon would rebound this season and while his best years are clearly behind him, I felt he was capable of OPS'ing around .780 and being a two or three-win player. Which makes what's occurred so far this season so confounding.
The easiest way to explain Gordon's struggles is his sudden propensity to hit the ball on the ground. Gordon currently has a 53.2 percent groundball rate; by far the highest of his career. He simply isn't elevating the baseball. Or, in Royals terms, he's caught a case of the Eric Hosmers.
Gordon has never been a big-time power hitter, but it's May 15 and he hasn't hit a home run. What's more, he has just five extra-base hits (!), all of which are doubles. Gordon has a career BABIP of .314. His current BABIP is .200. Usually, that's an indicator of bad luck that will correct itself over the course of 162 games. The issue with Gordon, as it has been with Hosmer, is when you hit the ball on the ground more than half of the time, those are usually converted into outs.
It's not bad luck, it's bad hitting.
According to longtime baseball writer Jayson Stark, who appears weekly with Soren Petro on 810 WHB in Kansas City, some scouts around baseball are speculating that Gordon can no longer get around on major-league fastballs. If that's true, it's even more baffling, considering that was Gordon's signature skill during his 2011-15 run, as he was the sixth-best hitter in the American League against fastballs, compiling a 92.4 runs above average, per Fangraphs. Other players on that list include: Miguel Cabrera, Mike Trout, Nelson Cruz, Jose Bautista and David Ortiz.
Since 2016, however, Gordon is just 1.1 runs above average against the pitch, a catastrophic dip. He enters the series against the New York Yankees batting .190 against four-seam fastballs and .167 against two-seamers, according to MLB Statcast data. The league average against those pitches is .271.
While it's still probably too early to conclude Gordon no longer has the bat speed to hit a major-league fastball, these are scary numbers for Royals fans.
While it's a blog topic for a different day, I was a major proponent of resigning Gordon back in 2016 and I was a fan of the contract. To me, Gordon fit the profile of a player who would age well. His diet and fitness regimen is renowned around baseball. He's a tremendous athlete, who transitioned seamlessly from third base to left field. He has always had a good eye at the plate. I likened him to Carlos Beltran in terms of aging gracefully and thought he could replicate that production through the course of his contract.
So far, that hasn't come to fruition. So it's fair to wonder if Gordon is in fact "done." If so, it severely hinders the Royals going forward and actually accentuates the club's need to sell at the deadline. A large part of me, however, believes there's some flukiness to all this. It's somewhat unprecedented for a player with Gordon's core attributes as a player to suddenly fall off a cliff at age 33. A decline was expected, but he's slugging .192 for God's sake. It seems inconceivable that this type of poor performance would continue.
For the Royals' sake, let's hope that intuition is accurate. Because if not, it'll be an ugly end to one of the greatest Royals careers of all time.
The question of whether the Royals should stay the course as a contender or have a fire sale will linger for the next month or so and will hinge, obviously, on the club's performance over that stretch.
Amidst all of this, a disturbing storyline has persisted. Alex Gordon, the team's highest-paid player, fan favorite and starting left fielder is lost at the plate. In 35 games he's hitting .152 with a .264 on-base percentage and a .192 slugging percentage. He is, quite simply, the worst hitter in baseball currently.
Gordon's sudden demise at the plate is perplexing to say the least. It's quite common for a hitter to decline once he reaches his early 30s and Gordon is 33. But there are very few examples of a player of Gordon's stature falling off a cliff like this.
Gordon's best season came in 2011 at age 27 when he hit .303/.376/.502. From 2011-2015 he was one of the best 10 players in baseball as measured by bWAR; though he's never again approached that .500 slugging percentage mark. During that five-year span Gordon settled in as about an .800 OPS guy who played Gold Glove defense in left field. He was the team's best player.
He showed zero signs of slowing down in his age 31 season in 2015 and, in fact, was tracking toward his best year since 2011 before going down with a nasty groin injury that caused him to miss about two months of the season. He still posted a career-high OBP season (.377) and had an OPS of .809. The Royals won a World Series, one which Gordon was a hero in, and in the offseason the club signed him to a franchise-record 4-year $72 million deal.
It has all gone awry since.
Playing against the White Sox in May Gordon collided with third baseman Mike Moustakas while going after a foul ball in what was the seminal moment of the season that was riddled with injuries to key players. Gordon broke his hand and missed six weeks. Moustakas tore his ACL and missed the rest of the season.
It was May 22 and Gordon was hitting .211/.319/.331. Not good, but it could simply be deemed a slow start and one that could be recovered from over the course of a full season. Gordon finished with a line .220/.312/.380. He had a .649 OPS in July, essentially his first full month back, and then showed signs of putting it all together in August when he hit .265/.348/.510. A bad September lowered his season totals. Gordon was actually right in line, given the time missed, with his career averages in home runs with 17. However, he was far below his extra-base hits totals.
I for one chalked up his poor season to nothing more than some misfortune. I felt his slow start was exacerbated by the injury and it was essentially a lost season. Not what you want from a guy making $16M a year on a small-market club, but understandable and nothing too alarming, although he did have a career high strikeout rate of 29.2 percent.
Ultimately, I was confident Gordon would rebound this season and while his best years are clearly behind him, I felt he was capable of OPS'ing around .780 and being a two or three-win player. Which makes what's occurred so far this season so confounding.
The easiest way to explain Gordon's struggles is his sudden propensity to hit the ball on the ground. Gordon currently has a 53.2 percent groundball rate; by far the highest of his career. He simply isn't elevating the baseball. Or, in Royals terms, he's caught a case of the Eric Hosmers.
Gordon has never been a big-time power hitter, but it's May 15 and he hasn't hit a home run. What's more, he has just five extra-base hits (!), all of which are doubles. Gordon has a career BABIP of .314. His current BABIP is .200. Usually, that's an indicator of bad luck that will correct itself over the course of 162 games. The issue with Gordon, as it has been with Hosmer, is when you hit the ball on the ground more than half of the time, those are usually converted into outs.
It's not bad luck, it's bad hitting.
According to longtime baseball writer Jayson Stark, who appears weekly with Soren Petro on 810 WHB in Kansas City, some scouts around baseball are speculating that Gordon can no longer get around on major-league fastballs. If that's true, it's even more baffling, considering that was Gordon's signature skill during his 2011-15 run, as he was the sixth-best hitter in the American League against fastballs, compiling a 92.4 runs above average, per Fangraphs. Other players on that list include: Miguel Cabrera, Mike Trout, Nelson Cruz, Jose Bautista and David Ortiz.
Since 2016, however, Gordon is just 1.1 runs above average against the pitch, a catastrophic dip. He enters the series against the New York Yankees batting .190 against four-seam fastballs and .167 against two-seamers, according to MLB Statcast data. The league average against those pitches is .271.
While it's still probably too early to conclude Gordon no longer has the bat speed to hit a major-league fastball, these are scary numbers for Royals fans.
While it's a blog topic for a different day, I was a major proponent of resigning Gordon back in 2016 and I was a fan of the contract. To me, Gordon fit the profile of a player who would age well. His diet and fitness regimen is renowned around baseball. He's a tremendous athlete, who transitioned seamlessly from third base to left field. He has always had a good eye at the plate. I likened him to Carlos Beltran in terms of aging gracefully and thought he could replicate that production through the course of his contract.
So far, that hasn't come to fruition. So it's fair to wonder if Gordon is in fact "done." If so, it severely hinders the Royals going forward and actually accentuates the club's need to sell at the deadline. A large part of me, however, believes there's some flukiness to all this. It's somewhat unprecedented for a player with Gordon's core attributes as a player to suddenly fall off a cliff at age 33. A decline was expected, but he's slugging .192 for God's sake. It seems inconceivable that this type of poor performance would continue.
For the Royals' sake, let's hope that intuition is accurate. Because if not, it'll be an ugly end to one of the greatest Royals careers of all time.
Thursday, April 27, 2017
A Royally Bad Start
Why the Royals 7-14 start is worse than you might think
On Wednesday the Royals fell 5-2 to the White Sox to complete a miserable road trip in which they lost seven straight games to the Rangers and White Sox. They are 7-14 and come back home to Kansas City this weekend to close out the month with a three-game series against the Twins.
Now while it should be noted that 7-14 stretches happen over the course of a 162-game season, even to playoff teams, the circumstances surrounding this stretch and what it means in the grand scheme of things exacerbate the slow start.
You see, the Royals don't have 141 games to turn this thing around. They have impending free agents up and down their lineup, a few of whom would be very valuable trade commodities for a team that has a less-than-stellar farm system and will be rebuilding beginning next season.
Thus, the Royals essentially have until the end of June, maybe the second week of July when the All-Star Game occurs, to turn things around and prove they are a contender. Using that metric, they have 67 games left to assert themselves as legitimate playoff contenders.
The most concerning thing, however, is the manner in which the Royals have reached the 7-14 mark. It's not a string of bad luck and close losses. They have a -33 run differential and have a major-league worst 54 runs in 21 games. The Royals, in their current makeup, I'm quite certain are not this bad. I believe it to be a bad month, one in which the offense has been inconceivably bad for a variety of reasons.
Unfortunately, the "it's early" logic doesn't apply to a team like the Royals once the calendar turns to May. The Royals do not have the benefit of a full schedule. With the rest of the American League, particularly the Central's performance also under consideration, the Royals likely need to go something like 40-27 over the next 67 games to avoid a necessary fire sale at the deadline. That would put them at 47-41, with, you would expect, a positive run differential and on the fringes of a playoff spot.
But the worst-case scenario might also be the more likely one. And that's the Royals playing about six or seven games above .500 over the next 67 to have a record of 44-44 or thereabouts. Depending on where that would put the Royals relative to the rest of the AL contenders will obviously be a major factor in how Dayton Moore decides to move forward.
Moore's track record suggests he'll allow this group to make a run at the postseason and even add pieces to shore up weak spots to aid them, because he has the utmost belief in his players. The caveat to that, however, is that he had little choice in 2013 and 2014. He had essentially gone all in ahead of the 2013 season by executing the Wil Myers-James Shields (now Wade Davis) trade. The Royals core was still young and all under contract for three or four more years. It made little sense to sell at the deadline.
In 2014, Moore was in year eight of being in charge and faced a make-or-break season. The Royals limped out of the All-Star break with four consecutive losses to fall to 48-50. Many called for them to blow it up and start over, because this group couldn't get it done. The Process had failed. The one problem with that logic was that blowing it up meant Moore would be in essence handing in his resignation letter to David Glass. He had no choice but to let the team try and work through their struggles and hope they could make a push to the first postseason since 1985. As we know, they got hot and did just that. And they stayed hot all the way to the World Series.
This isn't 2013 or 2014 though. The Royals have big-name free agents at the end of the season in Lorenzo Cain, Mike Moustakas and Eric Hosmer. Essentially the core of the World Series teams. What will Moore do if the Royals are six games out and hovering around .500 as the deadline nears?
That is the nightmare scenario for this organization, because the worse thing that can happen this season is the Royals falling woefully short of making the postseason having not got any return on their expiring assets. It could set the franchise back at least a couple years.
The far more prudent decision in that circumstance would be for Moore to recognize the slim chances and sell off what valuable assets he can in order to restock the farm system and accelerate the rebuild. But Moore has never faced this particular situation, so how he handles it is anyone's guess.
The Royals, of course, could make things easy on Moore and go on a 43-24 tear or do the opposite and go 30-37 over the next 67. Those are the ideal scenarios.
The 7-14 start, however, complicates things immensely and sets things up for a dicey couple of months for the franchise and its future.
On Wednesday the Royals fell 5-2 to the White Sox to complete a miserable road trip in which they lost seven straight games to the Rangers and White Sox. They are 7-14 and come back home to Kansas City this weekend to close out the month with a three-game series against the Twins.
Now while it should be noted that 7-14 stretches happen over the course of a 162-game season, even to playoff teams, the circumstances surrounding this stretch and what it means in the grand scheme of things exacerbate the slow start.
You see, the Royals don't have 141 games to turn this thing around. They have impending free agents up and down their lineup, a few of whom would be very valuable trade commodities for a team that has a less-than-stellar farm system and will be rebuilding beginning next season.
Thus, the Royals essentially have until the end of June, maybe the second week of July when the All-Star Game occurs, to turn things around and prove they are a contender. Using that metric, they have 67 games left to assert themselves as legitimate playoff contenders.
The most concerning thing, however, is the manner in which the Royals have reached the 7-14 mark. It's not a string of bad luck and close losses. They have a -33 run differential and have a major-league worst 54 runs in 21 games. The Royals, in their current makeup, I'm quite certain are not this bad. I believe it to be a bad month, one in which the offense has been inconceivably bad for a variety of reasons.
Unfortunately, the "it's early" logic doesn't apply to a team like the Royals once the calendar turns to May. The Royals do not have the benefit of a full schedule. With the rest of the American League, particularly the Central's performance also under consideration, the Royals likely need to go something like 40-27 over the next 67 games to avoid a necessary fire sale at the deadline. That would put them at 47-41, with, you would expect, a positive run differential and on the fringes of a playoff spot.
But the worst-case scenario might also be the more likely one. And that's the Royals playing about six or seven games above .500 over the next 67 to have a record of 44-44 or thereabouts. Depending on where that would put the Royals relative to the rest of the AL contenders will obviously be a major factor in how Dayton Moore decides to move forward.
Moore's track record suggests he'll allow this group to make a run at the postseason and even add pieces to shore up weak spots to aid them, because he has the utmost belief in his players. The caveat to that, however, is that he had little choice in 2013 and 2014. He had essentially gone all in ahead of the 2013 season by executing the Wil Myers-James Shields (now Wade Davis) trade. The Royals core was still young and all under contract for three or four more years. It made little sense to sell at the deadline.
In 2014, Moore was in year eight of being in charge and faced a make-or-break season. The Royals limped out of the All-Star break with four consecutive losses to fall to 48-50. Many called for them to blow it up and start over, because this group couldn't get it done. The Process had failed. The one problem with that logic was that blowing it up meant Moore would be in essence handing in his resignation letter to David Glass. He had no choice but to let the team try and work through their struggles and hope they could make a push to the first postseason since 1985. As we know, they got hot and did just that. And they stayed hot all the way to the World Series.
This isn't 2013 or 2014 though. The Royals have big-name free agents at the end of the season in Lorenzo Cain, Mike Moustakas and Eric Hosmer. Essentially the core of the World Series teams. What will Moore do if the Royals are six games out and hovering around .500 as the deadline nears?
That is the nightmare scenario for this organization, because the worse thing that can happen this season is the Royals falling woefully short of making the postseason having not got any return on their expiring assets. It could set the franchise back at least a couple years.
The far more prudent decision in that circumstance would be for Moore to recognize the slim chances and sell off what valuable assets he can in order to restock the farm system and accelerate the rebuild. But Moore has never faced this particular situation, so how he handles it is anyone's guess.
The Royals, of course, could make things easy on Moore and go on a 43-24 tear or do the opposite and go 30-37 over the next 67. Those are the ideal scenarios.
The 7-14 start, however, complicates things immensely and sets things up for a dicey couple of months for the franchise and its future.
Wednesday, April 19, 2017
The Eric Hosmer Conundrum
The Royals lost to the Giants 2-1 in 11 innings on Tuesday in what was the latest episode of futility for the struggling Royals offense. They have scored 39 runs in 13 games for an average of three runs per game. That is bad.
While there's multiple parties to blame for the low output thus far — Alex Gordon has a .513 OPS batting leadoff, Brandon Moss is at .592 as the team's DH, Paulo Orlando has an unthinkable -14 OPS+ and Raul Mondesi has a whopping OPS+ of 2 — the focus of this piece is Eric Hosmer.
To further exacerbate his dreadful start to the 2017 season, Hosmer came up in two critical late-inning spots against the Giants and failed both times. With the bases loaded amid a 1-1 game in the eighth and two outs, Hosmer grounded out to first base.
Facing lefty Steven Okert, Hosmer offered at a first pitch well outside the strike zone to fall behind 0-1. He laid off a similarly wild second pitch to even the count. He then, however, swung violently at the 1-1 offering that was inside, in an attempt to pull the ball. He instead fouled it off and fell behind 1-2.
At this point Okert has thrown three pitches well out of the zone with the bases loaded and the game on the line, yet he's ahead in the count thanks to Hosmer's impatience.
Sensing Hosmer's obvious overzealous approach, Okert threw Hosmer another breaking ball inside in hopes of a big pull swing. He got it and Hosmer grounded out harmlessly to first.
Thanks to some great bullpen work, the Royals again had a great opportunity to win the game, this time in walk-off fashion in the 10th inning. Mike Moustakas blooped a one-out single to center and Lorenzo Cain followed by lacing a single to center, putting runners on first and second with one out. Hosmer, the club's cleanup hitter, stepped to the plate again with a chance to win the game.
This time, facing righty Derek Law, Hosmer grounded into a 4-6-3 double play to end the inning. The Giants scored in the top of the 11th and won the game 2-1.
The fact Hosmer failed to deliver in both situations, on balance, isn't incredibly telling or unusual. Baseball players, even the best ones, fail in crucial spots all the time. It's part of the game. What is interesting and incredibly troubling is how predictable the manner in which Hosmer failed, a ground ball to the right side, was.
It's been well documented at this point, but it's perplexing enough that it warrants repeated mentioning: Hosmer, all 6 feet 4 inches and 225 pounds of him, is a groundball machine. And in his sixth season, at age 27, it isn't getting better; it's getting worse.
Last year Hosmer was second in all of baseball with an astounding 58.9 percent groundball rate. He hit line drives just 16.5 percent of the time and fly balls just 24.7 percent of the time. His GB/FB ratio was 2.38, up from 2.13 in 2015 which was up from 1.61 in 2014. This year his GB/FB ratio is 4.33 and he 63.4 percent of his batted balls in play have been groundballs. As a result, he's hit into a league-high six groundball double plays so far while batting .200/.259/.260.
It's a problem.
I have no doubt Hosmer will find his groove and climb his way back to respectable numbers. But the groundball issue is real and it has perpetuated itself. It is a byproduct of his swing, which he seems hell-bent on sticking with.
Hosmer has no issue generating power with his swing and he hasn't his entire career. His average home-run distance consistently ranks near the very top of the league. The problem is he's topped just 20 home runs once in his career, hitting a career-high 25 last season. Hosmer's average exit velocity this season is a little more than 90 mph, which is above league average. However, per Baseball Savant, Hosmer's launch angle is just under five degrees; the league average is 13 degrees.
It doesn't matter how hard you hit the ball if it's on the ground. At best it's a single, at worst, and much more frequently, it's an out. For someone with Hosmer's power, hitting ground balls should be a very rare occurence. Instead, it's the norm.
This poor start by Hosmer is bad for both parties. He's in a contract year and his agent, the all-powerful Scott Boras floated out the $200 million figure soon after Hosmer won the All-Star game MVP last season. Hosmer was in the midst of a decline that hasn't slowed entering the mid-July contest, but his numbers still looked pretty. He was hitting .324/.382/.547 after a June 10 win over the White Sox. From June 11 to the end of the season Hosmer hit .232/.297/.366 to finish with an OPS of .758 and a wRC+ right at league average of 101.
Hosmer isn't getting $200M even with a career-best season, mainly because his best season (.297/.363/.459 in 15) ranks around the middle of the pack for first basemen. Boras will tout Hosmer's winning pedigree, the ASG MVP, his clutch hitting and heroics in the postseason, but the reality is this: Hosmer to date is a light-hitting first baseman with a penchant for hitting the ball on the ground. He's a slightly lesser version than the Giants Brandon Belt, who received 5 years-$72.8M.
If that's where the market settles on Hosmer, then I'm quite certain the Royals would jump at the chance to bring him back. Hosmer though, through Boras' negotiation skills and the propensity for at least one GM being stupid enough to buy a player's perceived star power rather than assessing his actual overall value, likely gets more. The Royals would be very wise to let him walk and reallocate their financial resources elsewhere.
Because unless Hosmer overhauls his swing and takes the path of Josh Donaldson, J.D. Martinez and others, he is only going to get worse with age.
While there's multiple parties to blame for the low output thus far — Alex Gordon has a .513 OPS batting leadoff, Brandon Moss is at .592 as the team's DH, Paulo Orlando has an unthinkable -14 OPS+ and Raul Mondesi has a whopping OPS+ of 2 — the focus of this piece is Eric Hosmer.
To further exacerbate his dreadful start to the 2017 season, Hosmer came up in two critical late-inning spots against the Giants and failed both times. With the bases loaded amid a 1-1 game in the eighth and two outs, Hosmer grounded out to first base.
Facing lefty Steven Okert, Hosmer offered at a first pitch well outside the strike zone to fall behind 0-1. He laid off a similarly wild second pitch to even the count. He then, however, swung violently at the 1-1 offering that was inside, in an attempt to pull the ball. He instead fouled it off and fell behind 1-2.
At this point Okert has thrown three pitches well out of the zone with the bases loaded and the game on the line, yet he's ahead in the count thanks to Hosmer's impatience.
Sensing Hosmer's obvious overzealous approach, Okert threw Hosmer another breaking ball inside in hopes of a big pull swing. He got it and Hosmer grounded out harmlessly to first.
Thanks to some great bullpen work, the Royals again had a great opportunity to win the game, this time in walk-off fashion in the 10th inning. Mike Moustakas blooped a one-out single to center and Lorenzo Cain followed by lacing a single to center, putting runners on first and second with one out. Hosmer, the club's cleanup hitter, stepped to the plate again with a chance to win the game.
This time, facing righty Derek Law, Hosmer grounded into a 4-6-3 double play to end the inning. The Giants scored in the top of the 11th and won the game 2-1.
The fact Hosmer failed to deliver in both situations, on balance, isn't incredibly telling or unusual. Baseball players, even the best ones, fail in crucial spots all the time. It's part of the game. What is interesting and incredibly troubling is how predictable the manner in which Hosmer failed, a ground ball to the right side, was.
It's been well documented at this point, but it's perplexing enough that it warrants repeated mentioning: Hosmer, all 6 feet 4 inches and 225 pounds of him, is a groundball machine. And in his sixth season, at age 27, it isn't getting better; it's getting worse.
Last year Hosmer was second in all of baseball with an astounding 58.9 percent groundball rate. He hit line drives just 16.5 percent of the time and fly balls just 24.7 percent of the time. His GB/FB ratio was 2.38, up from 2.13 in 2015 which was up from 1.61 in 2014. This year his GB/FB ratio is 4.33 and he 63.4 percent of his batted balls in play have been groundballs. As a result, he's hit into a league-high six groundball double plays so far while batting .200/.259/.260.
It's a problem.
I have no doubt Hosmer will find his groove and climb his way back to respectable numbers. But the groundball issue is real and it has perpetuated itself. It is a byproduct of his swing, which he seems hell-bent on sticking with.
Hosmer has no issue generating power with his swing and he hasn't his entire career. His average home-run distance consistently ranks near the very top of the league. The problem is he's topped just 20 home runs once in his career, hitting a career-high 25 last season. Hosmer's average exit velocity this season is a little more than 90 mph, which is above league average. However, per Baseball Savant, Hosmer's launch angle is just under five degrees; the league average is 13 degrees.
It doesn't matter how hard you hit the ball if it's on the ground. At best it's a single, at worst, and much more frequently, it's an out. For someone with Hosmer's power, hitting ground balls should be a very rare occurence. Instead, it's the norm.
This poor start by Hosmer is bad for both parties. He's in a contract year and his agent, the all-powerful Scott Boras floated out the $200 million figure soon after Hosmer won the All-Star game MVP last season. Hosmer was in the midst of a decline that hasn't slowed entering the mid-July contest, but his numbers still looked pretty. He was hitting .324/.382/.547 after a June 10 win over the White Sox. From June 11 to the end of the season Hosmer hit .232/.297/.366 to finish with an OPS of .758 and a wRC+ right at league average of 101.
Hosmer isn't getting $200M even with a career-best season, mainly because his best season (.297/.363/.459 in 15) ranks around the middle of the pack for first basemen. Boras will tout Hosmer's winning pedigree, the ASG MVP, his clutch hitting and heroics in the postseason, but the reality is this: Hosmer to date is a light-hitting first baseman with a penchant for hitting the ball on the ground. He's a slightly lesser version than the Giants Brandon Belt, who received 5 years-$72.8M.
If that's where the market settles on Hosmer, then I'm quite certain the Royals would jump at the chance to bring him back. Hosmer though, through Boras' negotiation skills and the propensity for at least one GM being stupid enough to buy a player's perceived star power rather than assessing his actual overall value, likely gets more. The Royals would be very wise to let him walk and reallocate their financial resources elsewhere.
Because unless Hosmer overhauls his swing and takes the path of Josh Donaldson, J.D. Martinez and others, he is only going to get worse with age.
Friday, April 14, 2017
Royals Bullpen Issues Real and Fake
The Royals are nine games into the 2017 season and sit at 3-6. And the most discussed topic about the team so far is the bullpen. A unit that has come to define the Royals and their success the past three years has been a weakness through the first week and a half of the season.
The important part of the previous sentence is "first week and a half of the season." While the bullpen issues are no doubt concerning, it's also prudent to acknowledge the fact it could be a blip on the radar in an 162-game season. Lorenzo Cain leads the league in walks with 10 in nine games. Cain's career high for walks in a season is 37. Eric Hosmer has a .473 OPS. See where I'm going with this?
The best part about about the month of April is it means baseball is back. The worst part about the month of April is it means grand observations are formed on the basis of a very small sample of data, because it is the only data we have available at the moment. And media members have a job to discuss what's in front of them and their bosses won't accept "it's really early so I wouldn't worry about it" as an opinion every day of April.
If Hosmer has this stretch of futility at the plate in August while he's hitting .280/.340/.450, it's a lot less noticeable and less worrisome. If the bullpen has the stretch of ineffectiveness it has currently produced, which is a 7.81 ERA in 27.2 innings of work, through nine games in August while ranking as a top-five bullpen on the season, it's deemed a bad stretch, not an indictment of the unit.
None of this is to say the bullpen is fine and you shouldn't worry about it. There's some real concern thus far. It isn't just some string of bad luck. While their xFIP of 5.75 suggests some misfortune, the root of the bullpen's struggles so far is the byproduct of their own control, literally and figuratively. In the three true outcomes, the Royals bullpen is a mess so far. They've walked 7.48 batters per nine, struck out just 6.51 and allowed 1.3 home runs. That's troublesome to say the least.
What's more, the two pitchers who figured to be the Royals top options out of the pen, Matt Strahm and Kelvin Herrera, have been two of the biggest problems. Strahm made three appearances in the first six games and allowed seven runs and four hits while walking six and striking out none in 1.1 innings. He's since been sent down to Omaha to workout his issues.
Herrera, who earned his first save in not-so-smooth fashion against the A's on Thursday, has allowed two runs off three hits in three innings. His biggest issue so far, however, has been his alarming inability to miss bats, a staple of his success the past few years. Two of the three hits he's allowed have been home runs, including one that earned him a blown save in the series finale against Houston. And while he hasn't issued any walks, unlike the rest of the bullpen, he's managed just one strikeout.
I tend to believe Herrera will find his form as there's nothing in his peripherals to suggest a significant drop off just yet. But in my non-expert opinion, Herrera's off-speed pitches are what seem to be lagging. He added a devastating slider to his arsenal last season that made him borderline unfair. A wipeout slider combined with a fastball that touches 100 MPH and an above-average change-up is a lethal combination. His inability to find the same bite on the slider and his inability to locate his change-up so far have caused him to lean heavily on his fastball, which hitters haven't been fooled by very much so far. Even armed with just his fastball, assuming good location, Herrera is still an above-average reliever. The Royals need him to be better than that, so here's to hoping he regains his feel for the secondary pitches.
Travis Wood, who the Royals signed as a free agent has also been very bad. Wood has appeared in five games and has allowed six runs in just 2.2 innings of work while walking five and striking out just two. Wood's not-so-distant past suggests he's a much better pitcher than that. But walks have always been an issue for Wood and his inability to miss bats last season (6.93 K/9) is making his 2015 season with the Cubs (10.55 K/9) look more like an anomaly.
The Royals best two relievers have been Peter Moylan and Joakim Soria, both of whom have not allowed a run yet in a combined 9 innings of work. Both, however, have not been immune to the base on balls bug that has infected the entire Royals pitching staff. Moylan has issued two free passes and Soria has issued three.
A .429 BABIP against Strahm, a .333 BABIP against Wood suggest both have been unlucky. But neither have helped their own cause with walks and home runs. While it's unrealistic to expect Moylan and Soria to maintain their spotless ERA, it's equally unrealistic to expect Wood, Strahm and Herrera to combine for an ERA north of 20. Strahm and Herrera both possess stuff that's far too good to play above a 3 ERA in the pen.
So where does that leave the bullpen? Will it regain form and establish itself as the dominant force it has been in the recent past? Probably not. The Royals' bullpen run from 2013-2015 is unprecedented in baseball and a large reason why the team has been so hard to peg for advanced analytics folks. But given the track record under GM Dayton Moore, it's fair to think this year's version, given the current options and a few other young arms from the minors (hello Josh Staumont), could find itself near the top of the pack in the AL for bullpens.
If it doesn't and the trend from the first nine games continues, well, the Royals will be sellers at the trade deadline and the rebuild will be underway. Let's hope for the fan base's sake that doesn't come to fruition.
The important part of the previous sentence is "first week and a half of the season." While the bullpen issues are no doubt concerning, it's also prudent to acknowledge the fact it could be a blip on the radar in an 162-game season. Lorenzo Cain leads the league in walks with 10 in nine games. Cain's career high for walks in a season is 37. Eric Hosmer has a .473 OPS. See where I'm going with this?
The best part about about the month of April is it means baseball is back. The worst part about the month of April is it means grand observations are formed on the basis of a very small sample of data, because it is the only data we have available at the moment. And media members have a job to discuss what's in front of them and their bosses won't accept "it's really early so I wouldn't worry about it" as an opinion every day of April.
If Hosmer has this stretch of futility at the plate in August while he's hitting .280/.340/.450, it's a lot less noticeable and less worrisome. If the bullpen has the stretch of ineffectiveness it has currently produced, which is a 7.81 ERA in 27.2 innings of work, through nine games in August while ranking as a top-five bullpen on the season, it's deemed a bad stretch, not an indictment of the unit.
None of this is to say the bullpen is fine and you shouldn't worry about it. There's some real concern thus far. It isn't just some string of bad luck. While their xFIP of 5.75 suggests some misfortune, the root of the bullpen's struggles so far is the byproduct of their own control, literally and figuratively. In the three true outcomes, the Royals bullpen is a mess so far. They've walked 7.48 batters per nine, struck out just 6.51 and allowed 1.3 home runs. That's troublesome to say the least.
What's more, the two pitchers who figured to be the Royals top options out of the pen, Matt Strahm and Kelvin Herrera, have been two of the biggest problems. Strahm made three appearances in the first six games and allowed seven runs and four hits while walking six and striking out none in 1.1 innings. He's since been sent down to Omaha to workout his issues.
Herrera, who earned his first save in not-so-smooth fashion against the A's on Thursday, has allowed two runs off three hits in three innings. His biggest issue so far, however, has been his alarming inability to miss bats, a staple of his success the past few years. Two of the three hits he's allowed have been home runs, including one that earned him a blown save in the series finale against Houston. And while he hasn't issued any walks, unlike the rest of the bullpen, he's managed just one strikeout.
I tend to believe Herrera will find his form as there's nothing in his peripherals to suggest a significant drop off just yet. But in my non-expert opinion, Herrera's off-speed pitches are what seem to be lagging. He added a devastating slider to his arsenal last season that made him borderline unfair. A wipeout slider combined with a fastball that touches 100 MPH and an above-average change-up is a lethal combination. His inability to find the same bite on the slider and his inability to locate his change-up so far have caused him to lean heavily on his fastball, which hitters haven't been fooled by very much so far. Even armed with just his fastball, assuming good location, Herrera is still an above-average reliever. The Royals need him to be better than that, so here's to hoping he regains his feel for the secondary pitches.
Travis Wood, who the Royals signed as a free agent has also been very bad. Wood has appeared in five games and has allowed six runs in just 2.2 innings of work while walking five and striking out just two. Wood's not-so-distant past suggests he's a much better pitcher than that. But walks have always been an issue for Wood and his inability to miss bats last season (6.93 K/9) is making his 2015 season with the Cubs (10.55 K/9) look more like an anomaly.
The Royals best two relievers have been Peter Moylan and Joakim Soria, both of whom have not allowed a run yet in a combined 9 innings of work. Both, however, have not been immune to the base on balls bug that has infected the entire Royals pitching staff. Moylan has issued two free passes and Soria has issued three.
A .429 BABIP against Strahm, a .333 BABIP against Wood suggest both have been unlucky. But neither have helped their own cause with walks and home runs. While it's unrealistic to expect Moylan and Soria to maintain their spotless ERA, it's equally unrealistic to expect Wood, Strahm and Herrera to combine for an ERA north of 20. Strahm and Herrera both possess stuff that's far too good to play above a 3 ERA in the pen.
So where does that leave the bullpen? Will it regain form and establish itself as the dominant force it has been in the recent past? Probably not. The Royals' bullpen run from 2013-2015 is unprecedented in baseball and a large reason why the team has been so hard to peg for advanced analytics folks. But given the track record under GM Dayton Moore, it's fair to think this year's version, given the current options and a few other young arms from the minors (hello Josh Staumont), could find itself near the top of the pack in the AL for bullpens.
If it doesn't and the trend from the first nine games continues, well, the Royals will be sellers at the trade deadline and the rebuild will be underway. Let's hope for the fan base's sake that doesn't come to fruition.
Monday, March 27, 2017
Christian Pulisic: The Present and the Future
On Friday I headed to the Globe Pub, a fantastic soccer bar in Chicago's Irving Park, to watch the US men's national team play Honduras in a critical World Cup qualifying match. Having lost the first two games of qualifying in rather embarrassing fashion — a 2-1 home loss to Mexico and a 4-0 road loss to Costa Rica — the US entered the home match at the bottom of the CONCACAF table.
The US needed a win. It got it and then some in a 6-0 victory that erased a -5 goal differential and completely shifted the talk around the team in Bruce Arena's first important match as coach, taking over for Jurgen Klinsman who was sacked.
The result was huge. But there was a far more important takeaway for me in watching that match.
Christian Pulisic, the 18-year old from Hershey, Pennsylvania, is a star and is already the team's best player.
Arena slotted Pulisic in the attacking midfield position that Landon Donovan once occupied. Those are big shoes to fill because Donovan is arguably the greatest national team player ever. Pulisic, however, plays a prominent role for Borussia Dortmund and is doing quite well in the Bundesliga in front of 80,000 rabid soccer fans. So it should've come as no surprise that the phenom wasn't fazed in taking the reigns Friday against Honduras.
Having watched US soccer for years, it was impossible not to notice the difference in play against Honduras. I've never watched a performance quite like that and it had everything to do with Pulisic's presence.
Pulisic's technical ability combined with is athleticism and innate instincts make him unlike any player I've seen put on the red white and blue uniform. He has the ability to beat guys one v one. He is a pinpoint passer who sees the field exceptionally well. And, most importantly, he is a supremely gifted player when it comes to seeing plays develop and timing his runs.
When you combine him with Clint Dempsey and Jozy Altidore, a pair of talented goal scorers and good players in their own right, it allows for a formidable attack. Dempsey and Altidore reaped the benefits of having Pulisic beneath them. Pulisic drew so much attention from the Honduras side that Dempsey and Altidore found the type of space they just aren't accustomed to and they both did well with it. Altidore delivered a pair of beautiful passes that setup two goals, one of which Pulisic finished barely 30 seconds into the second half as a result of yet another gorgeous instinctual run.
Pulisic's two assists, both to Dempsey, were a thing of beauty as well. The first was a lovely chip that found Dempsey perfectly on his chest on a run into the box, which Dempsey put away. The second was a pass, quite frankly, that made me spill my beer. Pulisic saw the run before Dempsey even did and slotted a perfect ball — perfect in both space and in pace — through the Honduras defense as Dempsey realized the run mid pass and he finished his one v one versus the goalkeeper.
The hype around Pulisic has been building the past year. He's been very good and an impact player for one of the top clubs in Europe at just 18. This isn't a Freddy Adu situation. Pulisic isn't the future. He's the present and the future. He's already the team's best player and provides a dynamic up front that US soccer has never had.
Enjoy the ride.
The US needed a win. It got it and then some in a 6-0 victory that erased a -5 goal differential and completely shifted the talk around the team in Bruce Arena's first important match as coach, taking over for Jurgen Klinsman who was sacked.
The result was huge. But there was a far more important takeaway for me in watching that match.
Christian Pulisic, the 18-year old from Hershey, Pennsylvania, is a star and is already the team's best player.
Arena slotted Pulisic in the attacking midfield position that Landon Donovan once occupied. Those are big shoes to fill because Donovan is arguably the greatest national team player ever. Pulisic, however, plays a prominent role for Borussia Dortmund and is doing quite well in the Bundesliga in front of 80,000 rabid soccer fans. So it should've come as no surprise that the phenom wasn't fazed in taking the reigns Friday against Honduras.
Having watched US soccer for years, it was impossible not to notice the difference in play against Honduras. I've never watched a performance quite like that and it had everything to do with Pulisic's presence.
Pulisic's technical ability combined with is athleticism and innate instincts make him unlike any player I've seen put on the red white and blue uniform. He has the ability to beat guys one v one. He is a pinpoint passer who sees the field exceptionally well. And, most importantly, he is a supremely gifted player when it comes to seeing plays develop and timing his runs.
When you combine him with Clint Dempsey and Jozy Altidore, a pair of talented goal scorers and good players in their own right, it allows for a formidable attack. Dempsey and Altidore reaped the benefits of having Pulisic beneath them. Pulisic drew so much attention from the Honduras side that Dempsey and Altidore found the type of space they just aren't accustomed to and they both did well with it. Altidore delivered a pair of beautiful passes that setup two goals, one of which Pulisic finished barely 30 seconds into the second half as a result of yet another gorgeous instinctual run.
Pulisic's two assists, both to Dempsey, were a thing of beauty as well. The first was a lovely chip that found Dempsey perfectly on his chest on a run into the box, which Dempsey put away. The second was a pass, quite frankly, that made me spill my beer. Pulisic saw the run before Dempsey even did and slotted a perfect ball — perfect in both space and in pace — through the Honduras defense as Dempsey realized the run mid pass and he finished his one v one versus the goalkeeper.
The hype around Pulisic has been building the past year. He's been very good and an impact player for one of the top clubs in Europe at just 18. This isn't a Freddy Adu situation. Pulisic isn't the future. He's the present and the future. He's already the team's best player and provides a dynamic up front that US soccer has never had.
Enjoy the ride.
Wednesday, March 22, 2017
Cuonzo to Mizzou a Slam Dunk
On Monday Missouri made its hiring of Cuonzo Martin as the school's next men's basketball coach official with an introductory press conference. Martin takes over a program in desperate need of energy and in desperate need of stability.
The Kim Anderson era, as almost anyone could have seen coming when he was hired three years ago, was an abject failure. Mizzou went 26-67 under Anderson, including an 8-46 record in the SEC.
It's well known Anderson inherited a brutal situation thanks to the equally uninspiring and quite damaging pit stop in Columbia on the Frank Haith Tour. There were NCAA sanctions looming over the program that Haith brought from Miami and a nightmare APR (Academic Progress Rate) situation. In that regard, Anderson did an admirable job in getting the program back to a better APR standing. What was obvious fairly early on though, was that he would have no such success in the more important area of on-court success.
I'm of the belief that three years is the bare minimum a coach should receive before being fired and I'm an advocate of four years, because that's one full recruiting cycle. If you can't get a team to the NCAA Tournament by year four at a place like Mizzou, you're not cut out for the job and deserve to be fired. That's under the assumption, however, that you'll average more than nine wins in the first three years.
Quite simply, Kim Anderson left new AD Jim Sterk no choice but to fire him.
And with that, the Cuonzo Martin era begins at Mizzou.
Back in early February when it became obvious Mizzou would be looking for a new coach at the end of the season, I identified Martin as a candidate that I would love to see roaming the sidelines at Mizzou Arena. Martin's ties to the area as an East St. Louis native, his success at three very different programs and youth were all very attractive qualities to me. He seemed like a great fit, assuming he wanted the job.
Then the coaching carousel began to turn and suddenly now-former Indiana head coach Tom Crean emerged as a rumored candidate who might have legitimate interest in the job. As did, for the third coaching search in a row, Wichita State head coach Gregg Marshall; though I never viewed him as a serious candidate.
Once Crean became an option he replaced Martin at the top of my list. Crean was wildly successful at Marquette and led that program to a Final Four. He then took over the mess left behind by Kelvin Sampson at Indiana and, though he never advanced past the Sweet 16 in nine years on the job, he had a .606 winning percentage, led the Hoosiers to two Big Ten titles in his last five years on the job and earned a No. 1 seed in 2013. At most places, including Mizzou, that's a hell of a feat. At Indiana, apparently it gets you fired.
As the search progressed, it became fairly evident that Sterk's top candidate was Martin, however, and if he could get him, he would be the next head coach at Mizzou. That of course came to fruition.
To me, Martin or Crean were both great options. I just preferred Crean. That, however, was before the accessories that Martin is rumored to be bringing with him. That is the No. 1 recruit in the 2017 class Michael Porter Jr., a Columbia native, who was signed with Washington until it fired Lorenzo Romar, his godfather. That, of course, would come with the caveat that Michael Porter Sr. will be hired as an assistant coach. Jontay Porter, top-30 recruit in the class of 2018, will likely follow if that's the case and could reclassify to 2017 to join his older brother next season at Mizzou.
Martin is still compiling his staff and getting settled at Mizzou. But current Illinois signee and top-30 big man Jeremiah Tilmon and four-star point guard Mark Smith have also been linked to the Tigers. Porter Jr. alone makes the Tigers an infinitely more exciting and attractive squad next season who could compete for an NCAA Tournament spot. That additional haul would be a top-five recruiting class and instantly make Mizzou a threat to win the SEC.
It would be quite the turnaround from the last three seasons. But aside from all of that unconfirmed recruiting speculation, what does Martin do for Mizzou basketball in the long term? A splashy year one would go a long way toward returning the program to relevance and building a foundation for the future, but fans seek, check that, fans crave a coach who will build a consistent winner for the next 15-plus years. A coach who will lead the program to its first Final Four, or, perhaps, a national title. Is Martin that guy?
I have reason to believe he is, which is why he was my top choice back in February.
Martin's style has its critics, because his teams traditionally struggle on the offensive end. I've always felt at the college level, however, a team that is exceptional defensively year in and year out is more conducive to prolonged success. Martin's track record at Missouri State, Tennessee and Cal are evidence of that. He won at all three schools, going 186-121 (.606) overall in nine years.
Let's delve into that background a little, shall we?
I've seen some national media members wonder how he keeps getting gigs like he's some mediocre coach. I'm not sure I understand that logic. Missouri State is a traditionally awful basketball program. After going 11-20 in his first season, Martin led the Bears to back-to-back 20-plus win seasons and won the Missouri Valley outright in the third season with a 26-9 record overall. He beat Gregg Marshall's Wichita State club in Wichita that season too, by the way to clinch the league title. But the Bears were bounced in the MVC tourney and therefore didn't qualify for the NCAA Tournament.
Martin was hired the following season at Tennessee and inherited the Bruce Pearl show-cause mess that severely limited recruiting. Even still, Martin had three straight winning seasons with the Vols, going 63-41, and led them to the Sweet 16 in his final season. He, however, wasn't the beloved Bruce Pearl, so was never fully embraced at Tennessee, which is what led to him making a lateral move to Cal.
The criticism of Martin was that Tennessee only had to beat Mercer to get to that Sweet 16 — just the seventh in the program's history, by the way. Because, you know, Mercer upset Duke in a tournament traditionally littered with upsets. In 2011 Kansas made the Elite Eight without playing a seed better than a nine — and then they lost to 11-seed VCU. It happens quite often in the NCAA Tournament. Should we go back and analyze every team's run to the Sweet 16 or just take the accomplishment at face value like we do with basically every other program/coach?
In his three years at Cal, Martin went 62-39 and made the NCAA Tournament in 2015-16 as a No. 4 seed. The Bears were bounced in the first round by Hawaii.
**If there's one thing I'm most mad about from the Kim Anderson era at Mizzou it's that the last three seasons severely marred the way the program is viewed by casual college basketball fans and even some non-national writers who cover the sport. So the question was raised, why would Martin leave Cal for Mizzou? Isn't that a lateral move?**
Let me quickly address this. In what universe is Cal an equal or better job to Mizzou? Mizzou has endured the worst three-year stretch in program history, yet, it is just four years removed from a stretch in which it made the NCAA Tournament five years in a row and five years removed from being a No. 2 seed. Since the tournament expanded to 64 (now 68) teams, Cal has never received better than a four seed, which Martin got them. The streak of making the tournament five years in a row for Mizzou was the second such streak since 2000. In its entire history, Cal has never had a longer tourney streak than three years. Cal last made a Sweet 16 in 1997 — just its fourth in program history — and has two Sweet 16 appearances since basketball incorporated the three-point line. Mizzou has been to two Elite Eights in that span.
Cal's fan base is among the most apathetic among power-six programs. Mizzou routinely draws 14K when the program is winning. Martin will make $3.1 million per year at Mizzou. He made $1.8 at Cal.
Not even mentioning Martin's strong ties to the state of Missouri, it was an absolute no-brainer for him to leave Cal. Any coach, who didn't have ties to Cal, would leave Cal for Mizzou. It is a better job in every way. The fact this was even a discussion or a question, further accentuates how bad the Kim Anderson era was.
**end rant**
So, back to the question of whether Martin is the guy to get it done at Mizzou? I believe he possesses the necessary qualities to succeed. I believe there are good coaches who, if they are able to find the right situation, can excel at that place more so than they would anywhere else. Chris Mack at Xavier is an example of this for me. Bo Ryan/Greg Gard at Wisconsin are examples of this.
I think Martin fits the category of a coach who can be good a lot of places, but can be great at Mizzou. He is beloved and extremely well respected in the St. Louis basketball community — an area that consistently churns out top talent that never makes its way to Mizzou; Martin could go a long way toward fixing that. Missouri fans loved Norm Stewart, because first and foremost he was a good coach, but also because he was passionate about the state of Missouri and his teams played with an edge and a toughness. Martin might not have the same hatred Norm did for the neighbors to the West, but his teams win and do so by playing a hard-nosed brand of hoops predicated upon good defense.
That will work at Missouri.
The Kim Anderson era, as almost anyone could have seen coming when he was hired three years ago, was an abject failure. Mizzou went 26-67 under Anderson, including an 8-46 record in the SEC.
It's well known Anderson inherited a brutal situation thanks to the equally uninspiring and quite damaging pit stop in Columbia on the Frank Haith Tour. There were NCAA sanctions looming over the program that Haith brought from Miami and a nightmare APR (Academic Progress Rate) situation. In that regard, Anderson did an admirable job in getting the program back to a better APR standing. What was obvious fairly early on though, was that he would have no such success in the more important area of on-court success.
I'm of the belief that three years is the bare minimum a coach should receive before being fired and I'm an advocate of four years, because that's one full recruiting cycle. If you can't get a team to the NCAA Tournament by year four at a place like Mizzou, you're not cut out for the job and deserve to be fired. That's under the assumption, however, that you'll average more than nine wins in the first three years.
Quite simply, Kim Anderson left new AD Jim Sterk no choice but to fire him.
And with that, the Cuonzo Martin era begins at Mizzou.
Back in early February when it became obvious Mizzou would be looking for a new coach at the end of the season, I identified Martin as a candidate that I would love to see roaming the sidelines at Mizzou Arena. Martin's ties to the area as an East St. Louis native, his success at three very different programs and youth were all very attractive qualities to me. He seemed like a great fit, assuming he wanted the job.
Then the coaching carousel began to turn and suddenly now-former Indiana head coach Tom Crean emerged as a rumored candidate who might have legitimate interest in the job. As did, for the third coaching search in a row, Wichita State head coach Gregg Marshall; though I never viewed him as a serious candidate.
Once Crean became an option he replaced Martin at the top of my list. Crean was wildly successful at Marquette and led that program to a Final Four. He then took over the mess left behind by Kelvin Sampson at Indiana and, though he never advanced past the Sweet 16 in nine years on the job, he had a .606 winning percentage, led the Hoosiers to two Big Ten titles in his last five years on the job and earned a No. 1 seed in 2013. At most places, including Mizzou, that's a hell of a feat. At Indiana, apparently it gets you fired.
As the search progressed, it became fairly evident that Sterk's top candidate was Martin, however, and if he could get him, he would be the next head coach at Mizzou. That of course came to fruition.
To me, Martin or Crean were both great options. I just preferred Crean. That, however, was before the accessories that Martin is rumored to be bringing with him. That is the No. 1 recruit in the 2017 class Michael Porter Jr., a Columbia native, who was signed with Washington until it fired Lorenzo Romar, his godfather. That, of course, would come with the caveat that Michael Porter Sr. will be hired as an assistant coach. Jontay Porter, top-30 recruit in the class of 2018, will likely follow if that's the case and could reclassify to 2017 to join his older brother next season at Mizzou.
Martin is still compiling his staff and getting settled at Mizzou. But current Illinois signee and top-30 big man Jeremiah Tilmon and four-star point guard Mark Smith have also been linked to the Tigers. Porter Jr. alone makes the Tigers an infinitely more exciting and attractive squad next season who could compete for an NCAA Tournament spot. That additional haul would be a top-five recruiting class and instantly make Mizzou a threat to win the SEC.
It would be quite the turnaround from the last three seasons. But aside from all of that unconfirmed recruiting speculation, what does Martin do for Mizzou basketball in the long term? A splashy year one would go a long way toward returning the program to relevance and building a foundation for the future, but fans seek, check that, fans crave a coach who will build a consistent winner for the next 15-plus years. A coach who will lead the program to its first Final Four, or, perhaps, a national title. Is Martin that guy?
I have reason to believe he is, which is why he was my top choice back in February.
Martin's style has its critics, because his teams traditionally struggle on the offensive end. I've always felt at the college level, however, a team that is exceptional defensively year in and year out is more conducive to prolonged success. Martin's track record at Missouri State, Tennessee and Cal are evidence of that. He won at all three schools, going 186-121 (.606) overall in nine years.
Let's delve into that background a little, shall we?
I've seen some national media members wonder how he keeps getting gigs like he's some mediocre coach. I'm not sure I understand that logic. Missouri State is a traditionally awful basketball program. After going 11-20 in his first season, Martin led the Bears to back-to-back 20-plus win seasons and won the Missouri Valley outright in the third season with a 26-9 record overall. He beat Gregg Marshall's Wichita State club in Wichita that season too, by the way to clinch the league title. But the Bears were bounced in the MVC tourney and therefore didn't qualify for the NCAA Tournament.
Martin was hired the following season at Tennessee and inherited the Bruce Pearl show-cause mess that severely limited recruiting. Even still, Martin had three straight winning seasons with the Vols, going 63-41, and led them to the Sweet 16 in his final season. He, however, wasn't the beloved Bruce Pearl, so was never fully embraced at Tennessee, which is what led to him making a lateral move to Cal.
The criticism of Martin was that Tennessee only had to beat Mercer to get to that Sweet 16 — just the seventh in the program's history, by the way. Because, you know, Mercer upset Duke in a tournament traditionally littered with upsets. In 2011 Kansas made the Elite Eight without playing a seed better than a nine — and then they lost to 11-seed VCU. It happens quite often in the NCAA Tournament. Should we go back and analyze every team's run to the Sweet 16 or just take the accomplishment at face value like we do with basically every other program/coach?
In his three years at Cal, Martin went 62-39 and made the NCAA Tournament in 2015-16 as a No. 4 seed. The Bears were bounced in the first round by Hawaii.
**If there's one thing I'm most mad about from the Kim Anderson era at Mizzou it's that the last three seasons severely marred the way the program is viewed by casual college basketball fans and even some non-national writers who cover the sport. So the question was raised, why would Martin leave Cal for Mizzou? Isn't that a lateral move?**
Let me quickly address this. In what universe is Cal an equal or better job to Mizzou? Mizzou has endured the worst three-year stretch in program history, yet, it is just four years removed from a stretch in which it made the NCAA Tournament five years in a row and five years removed from being a No. 2 seed. Since the tournament expanded to 64 (now 68) teams, Cal has never received better than a four seed, which Martin got them. The streak of making the tournament five years in a row for Mizzou was the second such streak since 2000. In its entire history, Cal has never had a longer tourney streak than three years. Cal last made a Sweet 16 in 1997 — just its fourth in program history — and has two Sweet 16 appearances since basketball incorporated the three-point line. Mizzou has been to two Elite Eights in that span.
Cal's fan base is among the most apathetic among power-six programs. Mizzou routinely draws 14K when the program is winning. Martin will make $3.1 million per year at Mizzou. He made $1.8 at Cal.
Not even mentioning Martin's strong ties to the state of Missouri, it was an absolute no-brainer for him to leave Cal. Any coach, who didn't have ties to Cal, would leave Cal for Mizzou. It is a better job in every way. The fact this was even a discussion or a question, further accentuates how bad the Kim Anderson era was.
**end rant**
So, back to the question of whether Martin is the guy to get it done at Mizzou? I believe he possesses the necessary qualities to succeed. I believe there are good coaches who, if they are able to find the right situation, can excel at that place more so than they would anywhere else. Chris Mack at Xavier is an example of this for me. Bo Ryan/Greg Gard at Wisconsin are examples of this.
I think Martin fits the category of a coach who can be good a lot of places, but can be great at Mizzou. He is beloved and extremely well respected in the St. Louis basketball community — an area that consistently churns out top talent that never makes its way to Mizzou; Martin could go a long way toward fixing that. Missouri fans loved Norm Stewart, because first and foremost he was a good coach, but also because he was passionate about the state of Missouri and his teams played with an edge and a toughness. Martin might not have the same hatred Norm did for the neighbors to the West, but his teams win and do so by playing a hard-nosed brand of hoops predicated upon good defense.
That will work at Missouri.
Tuesday, February 7, 2017
Royals Do What's Necessary in Offseason
With one week remaining until the start of Spring Training, it appears as though the Kansas City Royals' busy offseason is mostly done. A brief recap of what's transpired:
- Traded RP Wade Davis to the Cubs OF for Jorge Soler
- Traded OF Jarrod Dyson to the Mariners for SP Nathan Karns
- Signed LHP Danny Duffy to five-year contract
- Signed 1B/OF Brandon Moss to a two-year contract
- Signed RHP Jason Hammel to a two-year contract
All in all, nothing flashy, but a lot of important moves that do move the needle in the right direction for the Royals in 2017, while also improving the team's chances for contention beyond this season. The most recent transaction, the signing of Jason Hammel, was, unfortunately, necessitated by the tragic death of Yordano Ventura.
Before I delve into what the Royals have done this offseason, I'd like to give a few thoughts on Ventura. By now, most baseball fans have read his story and how he was signed as a tiny 14-year old out of the Dominican Republic for $28,000 because he showed an unusually live arm for someone of that stature.
As he matured physically, his arm did as well, and despite being just six feet tall and 160 pounds soaking wet, he touched 100 MPH on the radar gun while also flashing a devastating breaking ball. I remember first hearing about Ventura back in 2012 when I lived in Springfield, Mo. and thinking that I had to go watch him pitch if he was on the mound when the AA Northwest Arkansas team made its way to town to play the Cardinals' AA affiliate. While that never transpired, the following year, as his star shined brighter and he advanced to AAA Omaha, I was just an hour-and-a-half drive away in Carroll, Iowa and made sure to go see him pitch.
My friend Jack and I got tickets about six rows up along the third-base line. To this day I can't recall watching a more amazing spectacle on the baseball diamond than someone that size — smaller than me — throwing a baseball that fast. His talent was undeniable. As a fan of baseball I was excited. As a Royals fan, I was elated. Ventura, if memory serves me, had a modest performance that evening and only went six innings while allowing a couple runs, but my buddy and I left convinced he was going to be a star. He was the ace the Royals staff had been missing.
Frankly, that never materialized. When Ventura first came up in 2014, he dazzled fans with how foolish he often made batters look. His swagger on the mound was infectious; it reminded me of Pedro in his prime. That year was Ventura's best season in terms of ERA, as he posted a 3.20 in 183 innings. He had an unforgettable performance in Game 6 of the World Series against the Giants while honoring his fellow countryman Oscar Taveras who died in a car accident in the D.R.; the dramatic irony of that moment now is enough to make you queasy. The next two years were filled with inconsistent performance and much-publicized on-field drama. The way Ventura carried himself rubbed people (old white male media members usually) and some opponents the wrong way.
I'll never forget several prominent local and national media members suggesting the Royals should trade Ventura after his brush up with Manny Machado early last season. While his extra-curricular actions on the field annoyed me at times, it never affected the way I viewed him as a player and an asset for the Royals. He signed an incredibly team-friendly deal (5 years-$23M) after the 2014 season. He oozed with talent and, on the surface, he just seemed like a emotional kid who got caught up in the passion of the game at times. I never wanted to see him shipped out of KC, however. He had too much potential and cost too little for a franchise that had very little in the way of starting pitching.
I'm left feeling both sad and incredibly shortchanged when it comes to Ventura's passing. It was an avoidable accident, one that's occurred to baseball stars far too often in recent months. Ventura always showed flashes of putting it all together as a pitcher and as a person. He, by all accounts, was a good kid who was just a little immature. He could've been a likable and mercurial star in the league for years to come. Instead, he's gone far too soon. And baseball and myself will miss him.
————
Taking a sharp left turn from that, the Royals had to move on and worry about the product on the field for 2017. They did that by signing the best available starting pitcher in free agency in Jason Hammel. Hammel doesn't possess Ventura's talent or his upside, but he did come close to replicating Ventura's production on the mound the past two seasons. At least for 2017, he was a necessary addition that helps shore up the starting rotation.
Rewinding back to December in the most significant move of the Royals offseason, they traded star closer Wade Davis to the Cubs for 24-year old outfielder Jorge Soler. This was a move I advocated for at the end of last season. It wasn't an original thought process, but it also wasn't a popular notion to ship off Davis, a beloved member of the most successful Royals teams in a generation. I won't rehash much of what I wrote, but it made a lot of sense to trade one year of Davis, a declining reliever, for four years of club control on Soler, whose upside is very intriguing. It also wasn't a tough decision for the Cubs, who had no place for Soler in a crowded outfield. Soler's outfield defense will be a major question mark in the spacious confines of Kauffman Stadium. He could, however, very well end up being the best power hitter on the team with a chance to OPS above .800, which would be a boon to a declining offense.
The Royals next move also made a lot of sense. They traded Jarrod Dyson, a fan and clubhouse favorite who had just one year left on his deal, for five years of Nathan Karns, a starting pitcher whose overall numbers don't impress, but his ability to miss bats (9.64 K/9 in 2016) do. Karns could become a mainstay in the rotation for the next few years at a very reasonable price and he has the upside of a No. 3 starter. Dyson, who is a fantastic defensive outfielder and incredible base runner that hits reasonably well against lefties, was never viewed as an everyday player for the Royals and his two biggest traits, speed and defense, are at risk as he enters his age 33 season.
The Royals signing/extending Danny Duffy was No. 1 on my list for offseason priorities. Duffy turned the corner in 2016 by, for lack of a better explanation, figuring out that if he consistently throws strikes he's really hard to hit. Duffy raised his K/9 significantly to where he profiles near the top of the league and cut down significantly on his walks. He certainly fits the profile of past star left-handed pitchers who all of the sudden figured it out in their late 20's. Duffy has a great fastball and above-average secondary pitches. He has the capability of being an ace and one of the best 10 pitchers in baseball and the Royals signed him for 5 years-$65M. For reference, had he replicated his performance from last season in 2017, he would've been looking at Jon Lester money in the form of 6 years-$155M. I can't commend Dayton Moore enough for getting this deal done.
The last piece of the puzzle, it would appear, was signing Brandon Moss. The Royals quite obviously needed to add another bat and, preferably, a lefty. What do you know? Moss fits both of those requisites. Moss doesn't fit the mold of the Royals hitter we've become accustomed to in recent years in that he strikes out a lot, but also walks at an above average rate, and hits for good power. Moss provides a lot of flexibility as well in that he can play the outfield and first base adequately, but he will most likely be featured as the team's DH, though club officials claim that will be a rotating spot. Moss is on a 2-year, $12 million deal with a team option in year two. In other words, there's zero risk for the Royals here and lots of upside. Moss was a three-win player last year for the Cardinals and Fangraphs Steamer projects him as a two-win player in 2017. He's an upgrade over Kendrys Morales for more than half the cost. Well done, Dayton.
As I'm sure it's obvious, I'm a big fan of the Royals' offseason. They addressed virtually every need heading into 2017 while also making some prudent moves for beyond that. That, however, doesn't guarantee success. In fact, PECOTA (Baseball Prospectus' projection model) projects the Royals to be 71-91, the second-worst team in baseball. PECOTA has consistently bought low on the Royals during the past few years due, mainly, to its ineffectiveness at measuring team defense and bullpens, both of which the Royals have been superb in the past three years.
I'll breakdown the Royals 2017 season closer to opening day, but I will most certainly be taking the over on 71 wins. The offseason by Dayton Moore has gone a long way toward providing optimism for Royals fans.
Monday, December 5, 2016
Mizzou Hoops and the Kim Anderson Conundrum
Seven games into Kim Anderson's third season as the Missouri men's basketball coach, the Tigers have done little to quiet the masses concerning Anderson's job security. The team is 4-3 and suffered a particularly embarrassing non-conference loss at home to North Carolina Central — a common occurrence for Anderson's teams.
The Tigers were also handled by Davidson in their second game of the Tire Pros Invitational, less than 24 hours after they nearly upset No. 11 Xavier, a game they quite clearly could have and should have won. Mizzou avoided another bad loss on Saturday by escaping with a three-point win over Western Kentucky, pushing it above .500.
It's fair to question if Anderson is the right man for this job. And it always has been fair. He has zero experience as a Division-I head coach.
It's also fair to point out what a mess he inherited thanks to the Frank Haith hurricane that is poised to continue its torrid and destructive path, improbably, throughout the college basketball landscape. Year three, usually, is a pivotal year for a head coach. It's when his first recruiting class has reached their junior season and a clear foundation and direction for the program should be laid out. By year three, you usually have a good idea of what you have in a coach.
To me, however, that has never applied to Anderson. He inherited a program that had been stockpiled with transfers and academically and behaviorally problematic players. In his first year he did well to hold onto a pair of four-star talents Haith recruited in Jakeenan Gant and Namon Wright and added another four star in Teki-Gill Ceaser. NCAA sanctions then came down midway through his first season for violations that occurred under Haith. Coupled with increasing APR concerns and overall awful play on the court, a complete gutting of the roster was not only necessary, but a foregone conclusion.
Thus, Anderson started completely from scratch in year two. His first real recruiting class was somewhat underwhelming on paper but possessed some decent building blocks in point guard Terrence Phillips, forward Kevin Puryear, shooting guard Cullen VanLeer and combo guard K.J. Walton. Due to the roster gutting alluded to above, the Tigers were without their leading scorer and most experienced player last season in Jonathan Williams III, who elected to transfer to Gonzaga, as he no doubt felt the onus of playmaking for a bad team lying squarely on his shoulders.
With just one senior in Ryan Rosburg, arguably one of the least impactful four-year players to ever come through Columbia, and a team full of freshmen needing to play important minutes, Mizzou limped to a 10-21 season.
And, again, with growing APR concerns and miscellaneous reasons still unknown, Wright, Gant and fellow sophomores Tremaine Isabell and Deangelo Allen all transferred at the end of the season. And thanks to junior Wes Clark electing to not attend class, leading to his dismissal, Mizzou entered this season with zero players remaining from the Haith era, just two years after he left.
It's an excuse all Mizzou fans are tired of hearing, but it remains true: it is a very young team, the youngest in the country. In fact, outside of JUCO transfer Russell Woods, a senior, the Tigers are entirely made up of freshmen and sophomores. None of whom are blue chippers.
That can be labeled as an excuse, but it's also a legitimate reason as to why there appears to be little progress in Anderson's third season. If you're a Mizzou fan and entered this season believing the team needed to come close to making the NCAA Tournament and playing in some sort of postseason such as the NIT, then you had Anderson fired before the year began. It's not a realistic goal for this team at this time.
For me, Mizzou needs to hover around the .500 mark for its overall record, which likely means going 8-10 or 7-11 in the SEC. That is an attainable goal and one that would qualify as progress for this program. And it **should** be enough to convince new AD Jim Sterk that Anderson deserves a fourth season.
Many will scoff at that notion, but the reasoning behind it is rooted in big-picture thinking. Do I believe Anderson is a great coach? Hell no. There are plenty of things to not like about his in-game coaching, particularly his usage of certain players and his inability to consistently find cohesive lineups conducive to success. VanLeer, who is the Tigers ninth or tenth most efficient player, continues to lead the team in minutes. He is treating an average role player, whose job should be coming off the bench for 10-15 minutes a game and knocking down a couple threes and making some hustle plays, like the team's best player. It is a massive coaching blunder and one that could have made the difference in the loss against NCCU or Xavier in which VanLeer played 30-plus minutes, had, say, KJ Walton, the team's most capable scorer, received those minutes.
There's plenty not to like. But this program, more than ever, desperately needs some stability. There are some interesting pieces on this team, to be sure, and they appear to genuinely care about playing for Mizzou and turning it around. A lack of effort is not the issue and hasn't been in a single game this season. That wasn't the case the past three or four seasons. They appear to enjoy playing with each other, which could lead toward some quality chemistry going forward. That's a credit to Anderson.
This is a program that is struggling to draw 5,000 people at Mizzou Arena, which is one of the nicest home venues in college basketball. The product on the court is obviously the most direct reason for this. But another element is that over the past few years the casual fan could not name three players on the team. There's very little connection between team and fan base. Another coaching change after this season will most likely lead to a massive overhaul in the roster. It then adds another three years to the rebuilding process and that's assuming you get the "right guy." That would be five coaches in the 16 years since legendary coach Norm Stewart retired. It's hard to establish a culture and feel a connection between team and fan base with that level of instability.
It could be a very intriguing squad assuming everyone returns next season and lack of experience will no longer be a crutch for poor performance. You also would have a clear idea of what you have in Anderson as a head coach, as he will have been given an appropriate amount of time to turn things around. If next season doesn't bring any postseason play and yields more of the same results, then you move on.
But this season, barring another 10 or 11-win disaster, should not close the book on the Anderson era.
The Tigers were also handled by Davidson in their second game of the Tire Pros Invitational, less than 24 hours after they nearly upset No. 11 Xavier, a game they quite clearly could have and should have won. Mizzou avoided another bad loss on Saturday by escaping with a three-point win over Western Kentucky, pushing it above .500.
It's fair to question if Anderson is the right man for this job. And it always has been fair. He has zero experience as a Division-I head coach.
It's also fair to point out what a mess he inherited thanks to the Frank Haith hurricane that is poised to continue its torrid and destructive path, improbably, throughout the college basketball landscape. Year three, usually, is a pivotal year for a head coach. It's when his first recruiting class has reached their junior season and a clear foundation and direction for the program should be laid out. By year three, you usually have a good idea of what you have in a coach.
To me, however, that has never applied to Anderson. He inherited a program that had been stockpiled with transfers and academically and behaviorally problematic players. In his first year he did well to hold onto a pair of four-star talents Haith recruited in Jakeenan Gant and Namon Wright and added another four star in Teki-Gill Ceaser. NCAA sanctions then came down midway through his first season for violations that occurred under Haith. Coupled with increasing APR concerns and overall awful play on the court, a complete gutting of the roster was not only necessary, but a foregone conclusion.
Thus, Anderson started completely from scratch in year two. His first real recruiting class was somewhat underwhelming on paper but possessed some decent building blocks in point guard Terrence Phillips, forward Kevin Puryear, shooting guard Cullen VanLeer and combo guard K.J. Walton. Due to the roster gutting alluded to above, the Tigers were without their leading scorer and most experienced player last season in Jonathan Williams III, who elected to transfer to Gonzaga, as he no doubt felt the onus of playmaking for a bad team lying squarely on his shoulders.
With just one senior in Ryan Rosburg, arguably one of the least impactful four-year players to ever come through Columbia, and a team full of freshmen needing to play important minutes, Mizzou limped to a 10-21 season.
And, again, with growing APR concerns and miscellaneous reasons still unknown, Wright, Gant and fellow sophomores Tremaine Isabell and Deangelo Allen all transferred at the end of the season. And thanks to junior Wes Clark electing to not attend class, leading to his dismissal, Mizzou entered this season with zero players remaining from the Haith era, just two years after he left.
It's an excuse all Mizzou fans are tired of hearing, but it remains true: it is a very young team, the youngest in the country. In fact, outside of JUCO transfer Russell Woods, a senior, the Tigers are entirely made up of freshmen and sophomores. None of whom are blue chippers.
That can be labeled as an excuse, but it's also a legitimate reason as to why there appears to be little progress in Anderson's third season. If you're a Mizzou fan and entered this season believing the team needed to come close to making the NCAA Tournament and playing in some sort of postseason such as the NIT, then you had Anderson fired before the year began. It's not a realistic goal for this team at this time.
For me, Mizzou needs to hover around the .500 mark for its overall record, which likely means going 8-10 or 7-11 in the SEC. That is an attainable goal and one that would qualify as progress for this program. And it **should** be enough to convince new AD Jim Sterk that Anderson deserves a fourth season.
Many will scoff at that notion, but the reasoning behind it is rooted in big-picture thinking. Do I believe Anderson is a great coach? Hell no. There are plenty of things to not like about his in-game coaching, particularly his usage of certain players and his inability to consistently find cohesive lineups conducive to success. VanLeer, who is the Tigers ninth or tenth most efficient player, continues to lead the team in minutes. He is treating an average role player, whose job should be coming off the bench for 10-15 minutes a game and knocking down a couple threes and making some hustle plays, like the team's best player. It is a massive coaching blunder and one that could have made the difference in the loss against NCCU or Xavier in which VanLeer played 30-plus minutes, had, say, KJ Walton, the team's most capable scorer, received those minutes.
There's plenty not to like. But this program, more than ever, desperately needs some stability. There are some interesting pieces on this team, to be sure, and they appear to genuinely care about playing for Mizzou and turning it around. A lack of effort is not the issue and hasn't been in a single game this season. That wasn't the case the past three or four seasons. They appear to enjoy playing with each other, which could lead toward some quality chemistry going forward. That's a credit to Anderson.
This is a program that is struggling to draw 5,000 people at Mizzou Arena, which is one of the nicest home venues in college basketball. The product on the court is obviously the most direct reason for this. But another element is that over the past few years the casual fan could not name three players on the team. There's very little connection between team and fan base. Another coaching change after this season will most likely lead to a massive overhaul in the roster. It then adds another three years to the rebuilding process and that's assuming you get the "right guy." That would be five coaches in the 16 years since legendary coach Norm Stewart retired. It's hard to establish a culture and feel a connection between team and fan base with that level of instability.
It could be a very intriguing squad assuming everyone returns next season and lack of experience will no longer be a crutch for poor performance. You also would have a clear idea of what you have in Anderson as a head coach, as he will have been given an appropriate amount of time to turn things around. If next season doesn't bring any postseason play and yields more of the same results, then you move on.
But this season, barring another 10 or 11-win disaster, should not close the book on the Anderson era.
Tuesday, October 11, 2016
Offseason Decisions
The 2016 MLB postseason is underway and for the first time since 2013, the Royals are not apart of it. Lame, right?
There's a myriad of reasons as to why that's the case, injuries chief among them. However, the Royals simply weren't good in almost all the areas they were the year before. The offense took a step back, scoring 49 less runs. The run prevention was also much worse, allowing 71 more runs. The bullpen was worse, the defense was much worse and the starting pitching, minus the emergence of Danny Duffy, was also worse.
So, after an 81-81 season and a roster full of players who will be free agents in 2017, the Royals enter the offseason with plenty of questions. Further complicating matters, GM Dayton Moore said in his end-of-season press conference that the team would likely be looking to cut payroll from the record $137-million mark it was at this season.
Given the state of the franchise, I don't see how they can reasonably expect to compete for a championship, which is the stated goal, while also cutting payroll. A rough estimate of arbitration figures among the current roster puts the Royals at $152 million. The Royals can trim $7.6 million from that by non-tendering Dillon Gee ($3.6M), Tim Collins ($1.5M), Daniel Nava ($1.5M) and Tony Cruz ($1.0M).
It's hard to imagine the team doesn't pick up the $10 million club option on Wade Davis or the $6.5 million club option on Alcides Escobar. So factoring in the non-tenders, the Royals' payroll would be around $144 million, assuming no moves at all. No moves at all would be bad. The Royals need starting pitching and likely another bat or two, as alluded to above.
This is where Moore and the front office can get bold and creative. The No. 1 priority this offseason should be signing Duffy to a multi-year extension. After that, it should be trading Davis.
It's hard to project the market for Davis, but there is always demand for top-flight relievers (Brian Sabean on line one) and if the price is anywhere near what was paid for Aroldis Chapman and Andrew Miller at the trade deadline this season, the Royals would be wise to make the move.
Davis has been a huge part of this franchise the past few seasons and is unquestionably one of the biggest reasons the team won back-to-back AL pennants and a World Series. But relievers, no matter how good, almost always have an expiration date. Moore's best attribute thus far as a GM has been his ability to build a bullpen with mostly cheap labor. Which is what made the signing of Joakim Soria (3 years-$24M) so perplexing. The less money a small-market team like the Royals spend on a bullpen the better. It allows them to allocate more resources to starting pitching and positional players, which have a greater impact on success.
Davis is great. But, despite putting up good numbers again in 2016 (1.87 ERA) his peripherals have declined. His strikeout rate has dropped steadily from his ridiculous 13.63 K/9 mark in 2014 all the way to 9.76 K/9 this year. He also walked 3.32 batters per nine, which is a considerable increase from the past two seasons. Never a good recipe. His value isn't at its peak, but it remains high. And the Royals' bullpen remained effective when Davis went down with an injury this season — oh yeah, he also hasn't been a model of health of late either. One way to cut payroll and allow spending on other needs while also potentially boosting the farm system for big-league success beyond 2017, is trading Davis.
The second move I would like to see Moore make is even more unlikely, but even more necessary. The Royals should decline the $6.5 million team option on Escobar.
Escobar has been a staple of the Royals' revival the past 5-6 seasons, shoring up the middle with fantastic defense since he came over in the Zack Grienke trade in 2011. He, however, is currently one of the worst hitters in baseball. Despite hitting a career-high seven home runs this season thanks to an end-of-the year surge, he posted a .642 OPS. His defense, while still above average, has also taken a noticeable step back and the metrics back that up. His baserunning, the one redeeming offensive quality he possesses, was also pedestrian this past year. Such is the reality of an aging middle infielder.
The Royals are clearly high on Raul Mondesi Jr., even if his play hasn't dictated the amount of admiration he appears to garner within the organization. He spent the second half of the season playing second base and while his defense looked good, he was completely overmatched at the plate. Had Mondesi impressed more, this might not even be a conversation. But since he struggled so mightily, it's unlikely the Royals would feel comfortable handing the shortstop job to the 21-year old in what is a critical season for the franchise.
I believe that is exactly what they should do though. Word has come out of the front office that they view Mondesi as their Francisco Lindor. It's hard to see him being that good, but there's definitely some merit to it given his reputation with the glove, switch-hitting ability and surprising power. My plea to the Royals would be this: If you believe in Mondesi to that extent, enough to push him through each level so rapidly, despite the production never necessarily matching the reputation, then why not persist with that strategy? Escobar was essentially a replacement-level shortstop this season. He is 30 years old and has no upside left in him. Can't Mondesi be at least that, with the potential to surprise and be much more?
I think the $6.5 million the Royals save is worth the risk and frees up even more money for other needs on the team if necessary. It also allows Cheslor Cuthbert, who had a solid rookie season filling in for Mike Moustakas at third base, to slide over to second base.
The main concern with both of these moves, especially with this organization, is how it will effect team chemistry. Escobar is certainly a beloved member of this core group, as is Davis. Parting with both in what is presumably the final year all these players will be together could ruffle some feathers in the club house. You know what cures those hurt feelings, though? Winning.
That, above all, has to be the priority. A couple unpopular moves are often required to win championships or to sustain success. And while it would be great if the same core group could continue on winning 90-plus games a year en route to titles, that's not reality.
Standing pat is not an option. Hopefully Moore and his brain trust recognize this.
There's a myriad of reasons as to why that's the case, injuries chief among them. However, the Royals simply weren't good in almost all the areas they were the year before. The offense took a step back, scoring 49 less runs. The run prevention was also much worse, allowing 71 more runs. The bullpen was worse, the defense was much worse and the starting pitching, minus the emergence of Danny Duffy, was also worse.
So, after an 81-81 season and a roster full of players who will be free agents in 2017, the Royals enter the offseason with plenty of questions. Further complicating matters, GM Dayton Moore said in his end-of-season press conference that the team would likely be looking to cut payroll from the record $137-million mark it was at this season.
Given the state of the franchise, I don't see how they can reasonably expect to compete for a championship, which is the stated goal, while also cutting payroll. A rough estimate of arbitration figures among the current roster puts the Royals at $152 million. The Royals can trim $7.6 million from that by non-tendering Dillon Gee ($3.6M), Tim Collins ($1.5M), Daniel Nava ($1.5M) and Tony Cruz ($1.0M).
It's hard to imagine the team doesn't pick up the $10 million club option on Wade Davis or the $6.5 million club option on Alcides Escobar. So factoring in the non-tenders, the Royals' payroll would be around $144 million, assuming no moves at all. No moves at all would be bad. The Royals need starting pitching and likely another bat or two, as alluded to above.
This is where Moore and the front office can get bold and creative. The No. 1 priority this offseason should be signing Duffy to a multi-year extension. After that, it should be trading Davis.
It's hard to project the market for Davis, but there is always demand for top-flight relievers (Brian Sabean on line one) and if the price is anywhere near what was paid for Aroldis Chapman and Andrew Miller at the trade deadline this season, the Royals would be wise to make the move.
Davis has been a huge part of this franchise the past few seasons and is unquestionably one of the biggest reasons the team won back-to-back AL pennants and a World Series. But relievers, no matter how good, almost always have an expiration date. Moore's best attribute thus far as a GM has been his ability to build a bullpen with mostly cheap labor. Which is what made the signing of Joakim Soria (3 years-$24M) so perplexing. The less money a small-market team like the Royals spend on a bullpen the better. It allows them to allocate more resources to starting pitching and positional players, which have a greater impact on success.
Davis is great. But, despite putting up good numbers again in 2016 (1.87 ERA) his peripherals have declined. His strikeout rate has dropped steadily from his ridiculous 13.63 K/9 mark in 2014 all the way to 9.76 K/9 this year. He also walked 3.32 batters per nine, which is a considerable increase from the past two seasons. Never a good recipe. His value isn't at its peak, but it remains high. And the Royals' bullpen remained effective when Davis went down with an injury this season — oh yeah, he also hasn't been a model of health of late either. One way to cut payroll and allow spending on other needs while also potentially boosting the farm system for big-league success beyond 2017, is trading Davis.
The second move I would like to see Moore make is even more unlikely, but even more necessary. The Royals should decline the $6.5 million team option on Escobar.
Escobar has been a staple of the Royals' revival the past 5-6 seasons, shoring up the middle with fantastic defense since he came over in the Zack Grienke trade in 2011. He, however, is currently one of the worst hitters in baseball. Despite hitting a career-high seven home runs this season thanks to an end-of-the year surge, he posted a .642 OPS. His defense, while still above average, has also taken a noticeable step back and the metrics back that up. His baserunning, the one redeeming offensive quality he possesses, was also pedestrian this past year. Such is the reality of an aging middle infielder.
The Royals are clearly high on Raul Mondesi Jr., even if his play hasn't dictated the amount of admiration he appears to garner within the organization. He spent the second half of the season playing second base and while his defense looked good, he was completely overmatched at the plate. Had Mondesi impressed more, this might not even be a conversation. But since he struggled so mightily, it's unlikely the Royals would feel comfortable handing the shortstop job to the 21-year old in what is a critical season for the franchise.
I believe that is exactly what they should do though. Word has come out of the front office that they view Mondesi as their Francisco Lindor. It's hard to see him being that good, but there's definitely some merit to it given his reputation with the glove, switch-hitting ability and surprising power. My plea to the Royals would be this: If you believe in Mondesi to that extent, enough to push him through each level so rapidly, despite the production never necessarily matching the reputation, then why not persist with that strategy? Escobar was essentially a replacement-level shortstop this season. He is 30 years old and has no upside left in him. Can't Mondesi be at least that, with the potential to surprise and be much more?
I think the $6.5 million the Royals save is worth the risk and frees up even more money for other needs on the team if necessary. It also allows Cheslor Cuthbert, who had a solid rookie season filling in for Mike Moustakas at third base, to slide over to second base.
The main concern with both of these moves, especially with this organization, is how it will effect team chemistry. Escobar is certainly a beloved member of this core group, as is Davis. Parting with both in what is presumably the final year all these players will be together could ruffle some feathers in the club house. You know what cures those hurt feelings, though? Winning.
That, above all, has to be the priority. A couple unpopular moves are often required to win championships or to sustain success. And while it would be great if the same core group could continue on winning 90-plus games a year en route to titles, that's not reality.
Standing pat is not an option. Hopefully Moore and his brain trust recognize this.
Tuesday, April 12, 2016
The Royals Lineup Game
As the Kansas City Royals returned to action this past weekend against the Twins after a peculiar two-games-in-five-days start to the season, I'd like to delve into the age-old game of critiquing Ned Yost's lineup. Pardon me, that's World Series Champion Manager Ned Yost.
It's true, criticizing anything about the Royals these days seems a bit like malpractice, given the overwhelming success the organization has had the past two seasons. However, that doesn't mean they are beyond reproach. Yost especially.
The seasoned manager has done some things I've really liked over the past couple years and I think he's really grown into the role. He's adapted, especially in the postseason, the way he goes about his decision-making process in many regards. Though history will forget his numerous errors and recognize him as the guy who helped transform baseball's doormat into a model franchise of sorts. But the entire Royals fan base had him fired midway through the 2014 Wild Card game and, perhaps, for justifiable reasons.
Yost has never been particularly adept at the skill of in-game managing, but he's always been revered for his ability to mold together a club house and it's hard to argue his style hasn't been beneficial to this team. But, that's neither here nor there.
I'm here to assess his 2016 linuep. Which, for now, is as follows:
1) Alcides Escobar
2) Mike Moustakas
3) Lorenzo Cain
4) Eric Hosmer
5) Kendrys Morales
6) Alex Gordon
7) Sal Perez
8) Omar Infante
9) Raymond Fuentes
This is the second year in a row that Yost has convinced himself Escobar is a different hitter at the top of the order. And that belief is rooted in Escobar's postseason success at the leadoff spot, which is real, as he hit .329/.347/.514 in last year's playoffs, including a .478/.481/.652 line against Toronto which earned him ALCS MVP. But it's also an extremely small sample size. Without getting off track too much and dissecting the imposible theory of whether certain players are more "clutch" than others, it's certainly not disputable that Escobar has been a much better hitter in the postesason than in the regular season where he is a career .300 OBP guy.
That sort of thing can be hidden in 15-20 games if a player gets hot. It can't be in a 162-game season. Escobar is 29. He is who he is at this point in his career. Over the course of a full season, the Royals are a better team if he is receiving less plate appearances than say, Alex Gordon, a career .350 OBP guy who is coming off a career-high .377 OBP season last year, yet is once again slotted in the six hole. The Royals are a better team if Gordon is receiving the 30 or so plate appearance he loses from being so far down in the lineup.
Moustakas, slotted once again in the two hole to begin the season, is also an ill-advised decision. Though it was more head-scratching last season, given the fact Moustakas was nearly a lost cause at the plate as a big leaguer, with his best season coming as a rookie in 2011 when he hit .263/.309/.367. To his credit, Moustakas, almost remarkably, completely retooled his swing and his approach at the plate to destroy the shift to the tune of .356/.420/.522 the first month of the season. He cooled off in ensuing months and eventually was relegated back to the six hole in the lineup, but he went on to post, by far, the best season of his career with a .284/.348/.470 line.
Moustakas turning into a revelation at the plate was a huge reason why the Royals were so good last season. And there are certainly more egregious choices than slotting him second in the lineup. However, it's fair to expect him to be a tick off his 2015 campaign, especially in the on-base department, given how drastic an improvement it was from his career averages where he remains a .300 OPB hitter.
The Royals' most optimal lineup, to me, looks something like this (career averages included):
1) Gordon .268/.348/.434
2) Cain .286/.336./.417
3) Hosmer .280/.337/.427
4) Morales .274/.330/.465
5) Moustakas .247/.303/.401
6) Perez .278/.306/.431
7) Colon/Infante .303/.365/.381 ... .272/.309/.388
8) Fuentes/Dyson .255/.320/.343
9) Escobar .262/.298/.344
It's minor changes, of course. And even if it operated at optimal form, it's worth maybe two wins on the season. But two wins is two wins. Despite the success the past three years, the Royals' lineup had been below average until last season. Cain has turned into a fascinating player — always a defensive gem who has suddenly found himself at the plate and turned into one of the game's best players. He is, for now, the Royals best player and hitter and should be slotted accordingly in the two hole. Gordon, one of the few anomalies on a team who strikes out so rarely, has a propensity to whiff far more often than his teammates while also drawing more walks, making him an ideal leadoff guy for this club.
Power is appropriately placed in the middle of the order while an interesting mixture rounds out the bottom third of the order with good OBP (FREE COLON) and speed resides.
This is all a moot point, however. The Royals, and Ned Yost specifically, believe they have a magic formula with Escobar leading off. And though it makes zero sense analytically, it has been conducive to success in where it matters most: in the postseason. But you have to get to the postseason in order to deploy the strategy and a better lineup construction would aid that.
As was the case last season, I fully expect the necessary changes to be made in June or July. So for now, enjoy the free-swinging spectacle to start off Royals games.
It's true, criticizing anything about the Royals these days seems a bit like malpractice, given the overwhelming success the organization has had the past two seasons. However, that doesn't mean they are beyond reproach. Yost especially.
The seasoned manager has done some things I've really liked over the past couple years and I think he's really grown into the role. He's adapted, especially in the postseason, the way he goes about his decision-making process in many regards. Though history will forget his numerous errors and recognize him as the guy who helped transform baseball's doormat into a model franchise of sorts. But the entire Royals fan base had him fired midway through the 2014 Wild Card game and, perhaps, for justifiable reasons.
Yost has never been particularly adept at the skill of in-game managing, but he's always been revered for his ability to mold together a club house and it's hard to argue his style hasn't been beneficial to this team. But, that's neither here nor there.
I'm here to assess his 2016 linuep. Which, for now, is as follows:
1) Alcides Escobar
2) Mike Moustakas
3) Lorenzo Cain
4) Eric Hosmer
5) Kendrys Morales
6) Alex Gordon
7) Sal Perez
8) Omar Infante
9) Raymond Fuentes
This is the second year in a row that Yost has convinced himself Escobar is a different hitter at the top of the order. And that belief is rooted in Escobar's postseason success at the leadoff spot, which is real, as he hit .329/.347/.514 in last year's playoffs, including a .478/.481/.652 line against Toronto which earned him ALCS MVP. But it's also an extremely small sample size. Without getting off track too much and dissecting the imposible theory of whether certain players are more "clutch" than others, it's certainly not disputable that Escobar has been a much better hitter in the postesason than in the regular season where he is a career .300 OBP guy.
That sort of thing can be hidden in 15-20 games if a player gets hot. It can't be in a 162-game season. Escobar is 29. He is who he is at this point in his career. Over the course of a full season, the Royals are a better team if he is receiving less plate appearances than say, Alex Gordon, a career .350 OBP guy who is coming off a career-high .377 OBP season last year, yet is once again slotted in the six hole. The Royals are a better team if Gordon is receiving the 30 or so plate appearance he loses from being so far down in the lineup.
Moustakas, slotted once again in the two hole to begin the season, is also an ill-advised decision. Though it was more head-scratching last season, given the fact Moustakas was nearly a lost cause at the plate as a big leaguer, with his best season coming as a rookie in 2011 when he hit .263/.309/.367. To his credit, Moustakas, almost remarkably, completely retooled his swing and his approach at the plate to destroy the shift to the tune of .356/.420/.522 the first month of the season. He cooled off in ensuing months and eventually was relegated back to the six hole in the lineup, but he went on to post, by far, the best season of his career with a .284/.348/.470 line.
Moustakas turning into a revelation at the plate was a huge reason why the Royals were so good last season. And there are certainly more egregious choices than slotting him second in the lineup. However, it's fair to expect him to be a tick off his 2015 campaign, especially in the on-base department, given how drastic an improvement it was from his career averages where he remains a .300 OPB hitter.
The Royals' most optimal lineup, to me, looks something like this (career averages included):
1) Gordon .268/.348/.434
2) Cain .286/.336./.417
3) Hosmer .280/.337/.427
4) Morales .274/.330/.465
5) Moustakas .247/.303/.401
6) Perez .278/.306/.431
7) Colon/Infante .303/.365/.381 ... .272/.309/.388
8) Fuentes/Dyson .255/.320/.343
9) Escobar .262/.298/.344
It's minor changes, of course. And even if it operated at optimal form, it's worth maybe two wins on the season. But two wins is two wins. Despite the success the past three years, the Royals' lineup had been below average until last season. Cain has turned into a fascinating player — always a defensive gem who has suddenly found himself at the plate and turned into one of the game's best players. He is, for now, the Royals best player and hitter and should be slotted accordingly in the two hole. Gordon, one of the few anomalies on a team who strikes out so rarely, has a propensity to whiff far more often than his teammates while also drawing more walks, making him an ideal leadoff guy for this club.
Power is appropriately placed in the middle of the order while an interesting mixture rounds out the bottom third of the order with good OBP (FREE COLON) and speed resides.
This is all a moot point, however. The Royals, and Ned Yost specifically, believe they have a magic formula with Escobar leading off. And though it makes zero sense analytically, it has been conducive to success in where it matters most: in the postseason. But you have to get to the postseason in order to deploy the strategy and a better lineup construction would aid that.
As was the case last season, I fully expect the necessary changes to be made in June or July. So for now, enjoy the free-swinging spectacle to start off Royals games.
Thursday, April 7, 2016
Grand Missteps: Daryl Morey and the Rockets
After Wednesday's narrow defeat at Dallas the Houston Rockets are a full game out of the eighth and final playoff spot in the Western Conference. The 88-86 loss to the Mavericks was the latest disappointment in a season that's been full of them. The Rockets (38-40) trail the Utah Jazz (39-39) by a game in the standings with four left to play.
They have more than a puncher's chance to sneak in to the final slot, with their final four games against cellar dwellers in the Suns, Lakers, Timberwolves and Kings, while the Jazz and Mavericks square off against each other in the penultimate game of the season. The Jazz also host the Clippers and have a road test at Denver.
All of that, however, is backdrop, while larger questiond about this Rockets' season loom, including: what happened? This is virtually the same team that went 56-26 last season and reached the conference finals. To go from that to this — a dysfunctional group of misfit toys on the brink of missing the postseason in a year where the Western Conference is as mediocre as its been in a decade — is perplexing.
On the surface, James Harden has followed up the best season of his career with an equally impressive 2015-16 campaign. The numbers (28.6 ppg., 7.5 apg., 6.3 rpg.) are actually up from last year and his 25.05 PER (Player Efficiency Rating), is just a tick off his 26.76 pace last year. However, if you've watched the Rockets this season, you know that's not close to true. Harden's played great the second half of the season, but it was what he did the first few weeks of the season that set the tone for this year. He was in the news during the offseason for activities not related to basketball, namely, his involvement with the least-desirable Kardashian. And he showed up to camp overweight. Say what you will about his private life (though dating a Kardashian is a documented terrible idea for any athlete), but when the team's star player shows up to camp out of shape and overweight, that's never a good sign.
The Rockets, unsurprisingly, stumbled out of the gates and got off to an 4-7 start. Kevin McHale took the fall for the poor start and was fired; never mind the fact Harden was atrocious during the lackluster start to the season while he tried to play his way into shape J.B. Bickerstaff took over, to the delight of Harden, who undoubtedly played a large role in McHale's firing, and the team has more or less been the same in the 67 games that have followed.
I'm not going to use this space to try and delve into what has ailed the Rockets this year. It's really been a combination of things. Dwight Howard is no longer a premier big man in a league that has slowly gravitated away from the low-post game. His defensive prowess is mitigated when team's go to the increasingly popular small-ball lineups that includes stretch 5's, dragging him out to an uncomfortable space on the perimeter. Plus, he's not nearly the same rebounder he used to be and is almost unplayable down the stretch due to is abysmal free-throw shooting. He and Harden found glimpses of synergy last season and it resulted in some wonderful pick-and-roll combinations, which helped fuel the playoff run. But neither has been on the same page this season. Josh Smith hasn't provided the same ineffable boost this season. Terrence Jones, who at times looked like he was coming into his own as a quality power forward last season, has been a disaster this year and has seen his minutes decrease in favor of Clint Capela. Sadly, one of the main positives of the year has been the pleasant surprise of Michael Beasley on the offensive end — though he still hasn't fully grasped the evolving analytics of how stupid taking 20-foot twos are, but I digress.
None of that of course matters much. What matters is this team has been a lost cause, for this season anyway, since late January and the inability of GM Daryl Morey to realize this has set the franchise back. It was quite obvious whatever magic the team had captured last year was not going to suddenly manifest itself in 2015-16, so with Howard's impending free agency, it would've been prudent to blow it up at the trade deadline.
It's true, the Rockets wouldn't have gotten a great haul for Howard, but moving him went beyond acquiring assets. Fair or unfair, there's very little to gain for a team like the Rockets from sneaking into the eight spot of the playoffs and much to lose from finishing ninth or 10th. This is not a young team trying to mold itself into a title contender, taking baby steps along the way. In fact, it's quite the opposite. Outside of Harden, whose 26, it's an aging and declining roster that can point to who else as a young building block? Capela?
This "playoff hunt" masks the fact the Rockets face an unstable and uncertain future. Harden, under contract through 2019, has to be the star to build around. And despite how unappealing that sounds, given what's occurred this season, he is still unquestionably one of the ten best players in the league and you have to have at least one of "those guys" if you aspire to win a title. The problem, however, is the short list of players who appear to want to play with him. Morey has a proven track record of swinging for the fences in free agency. It's unclear though who he'd be able to bring in to pair alongside Harden.
Thus, the focus might have to be the draft.
Trading Howard and perhaps Ariza at the deadline would've served twofold. It brought back assets and provided a chance to see what the team looks like with Harden as the absolute focal point with perhaps some young players around him. If it didn't work out, it also quietly served as a silent tanking mechanism that would've allowed the team to sneak up the draft board to add a much-needed young building block. The Pelicans, who admittedly got off to a much worse start than the Rockets, identified the season as a lost cause at the appropriate time and have rested, err, been blessed with injuries to key cogs like Anthony Davis the final couple months of the season allowing them to vault up the draft lottery.
Morey and the Rockets would've been wise to employ the same tactic. But instead they fooled themselves into believing this core would recapture last season's form and make it into the playoffs with a real shot to make a run. That's not a strategy, it's hope. And you don't win championships based off hope. Morey, an accomplished GM with a keen eye for analytics, should know this better than anyone.
His inaction at the deadline undermined his own long-term goals for this franchise and it complicated the rebuilding efforts going forward. The Rockets will pick in the bottom part of the lottery at best where they're unlikely to find a difference maker — though Tyler Ullis is an interesting option at point guard. It's a far cry from where they were at this point last season and the fall has no doubt been swift.
Morey and Harden carry the most responsibility, thus bear the most blame. The ramifications from this year will extend well beyond next year and both are culpable in what has proven to be a disastrous season.
They have more than a puncher's chance to sneak in to the final slot, with their final four games against cellar dwellers in the Suns, Lakers, Timberwolves and Kings, while the Jazz and Mavericks square off against each other in the penultimate game of the season. The Jazz also host the Clippers and have a road test at Denver.
All of that, however, is backdrop, while larger questiond about this Rockets' season loom, including: what happened? This is virtually the same team that went 56-26 last season and reached the conference finals. To go from that to this — a dysfunctional group of misfit toys on the brink of missing the postseason in a year where the Western Conference is as mediocre as its been in a decade — is perplexing.
On the surface, James Harden has followed up the best season of his career with an equally impressive 2015-16 campaign. The numbers (28.6 ppg., 7.5 apg., 6.3 rpg.) are actually up from last year and his 25.05 PER (Player Efficiency Rating), is just a tick off his 26.76 pace last year. However, if you've watched the Rockets this season, you know that's not close to true. Harden's played great the second half of the season, but it was what he did the first few weeks of the season that set the tone for this year. He was in the news during the offseason for activities not related to basketball, namely, his involvement with the least-desirable Kardashian. And he showed up to camp overweight. Say what you will about his private life (though dating a Kardashian is a documented terrible idea for any athlete), but when the team's star player shows up to camp out of shape and overweight, that's never a good sign.
The Rockets, unsurprisingly, stumbled out of the gates and got off to an 4-7 start. Kevin McHale took the fall for the poor start and was fired; never mind the fact Harden was atrocious during the lackluster start to the season while he tried to play his way into shape J.B. Bickerstaff took over, to the delight of Harden, who undoubtedly played a large role in McHale's firing, and the team has more or less been the same in the 67 games that have followed.
I'm not going to use this space to try and delve into what has ailed the Rockets this year. It's really been a combination of things. Dwight Howard is no longer a premier big man in a league that has slowly gravitated away from the low-post game. His defensive prowess is mitigated when team's go to the increasingly popular small-ball lineups that includes stretch 5's, dragging him out to an uncomfortable space on the perimeter. Plus, he's not nearly the same rebounder he used to be and is almost unplayable down the stretch due to is abysmal free-throw shooting. He and Harden found glimpses of synergy last season and it resulted in some wonderful pick-and-roll combinations, which helped fuel the playoff run. But neither has been on the same page this season. Josh Smith hasn't provided the same ineffable boost this season. Terrence Jones, who at times looked like he was coming into his own as a quality power forward last season, has been a disaster this year and has seen his minutes decrease in favor of Clint Capela. Sadly, one of the main positives of the year has been the pleasant surprise of Michael Beasley on the offensive end — though he still hasn't fully grasped the evolving analytics of how stupid taking 20-foot twos are, but I digress.
None of that of course matters much. What matters is this team has been a lost cause, for this season anyway, since late January and the inability of GM Daryl Morey to realize this has set the franchise back. It was quite obvious whatever magic the team had captured last year was not going to suddenly manifest itself in 2015-16, so with Howard's impending free agency, it would've been prudent to blow it up at the trade deadline.
It's true, the Rockets wouldn't have gotten a great haul for Howard, but moving him went beyond acquiring assets. Fair or unfair, there's very little to gain for a team like the Rockets from sneaking into the eight spot of the playoffs and much to lose from finishing ninth or 10th. This is not a young team trying to mold itself into a title contender, taking baby steps along the way. In fact, it's quite the opposite. Outside of Harden, whose 26, it's an aging and declining roster that can point to who else as a young building block? Capela?
This "playoff hunt" masks the fact the Rockets face an unstable and uncertain future. Harden, under contract through 2019, has to be the star to build around. And despite how unappealing that sounds, given what's occurred this season, he is still unquestionably one of the ten best players in the league and you have to have at least one of "those guys" if you aspire to win a title. The problem, however, is the short list of players who appear to want to play with him. Morey has a proven track record of swinging for the fences in free agency. It's unclear though who he'd be able to bring in to pair alongside Harden.
Thus, the focus might have to be the draft.
Trading Howard and perhaps Ariza at the deadline would've served twofold. It brought back assets and provided a chance to see what the team looks like with Harden as the absolute focal point with perhaps some young players around him. If it didn't work out, it also quietly served as a silent tanking mechanism that would've allowed the team to sneak up the draft board to add a much-needed young building block. The Pelicans, who admittedly got off to a much worse start than the Rockets, identified the season as a lost cause at the appropriate time and have rested, err, been blessed with injuries to key cogs like Anthony Davis the final couple months of the season allowing them to vault up the draft lottery.
Morey and the Rockets would've been wise to employ the same tactic. But instead they fooled themselves into believing this core would recapture last season's form and make it into the playoffs with a real shot to make a run. That's not a strategy, it's hope. And you don't win championships based off hope. Morey, an accomplished GM with a keen eye for analytics, should know this better than anyone.
His inaction at the deadline undermined his own long-term goals for this franchise and it complicated the rebuilding efforts going forward. The Rockets will pick in the bottom part of the lottery at best where they're unlikely to find a difference maker — though Tyler Ullis is an interesting option at point guard. It's a far cry from where they were at this point last season and the fall has no doubt been swift.
Morey and Harden carry the most responsibility, thus bear the most blame. The ramifications from this year will extend well beyond next year and both are culpable in what has proven to be a disastrous season.
Wednesday, April 6, 2016
Sweet Home Chicago
As I gaze upon Lake Michigan from my apartment in downtown Chicago, I'm filled with insatiable ambition and also a little trepidation.
Such is the juxtaposition of emotion when taking a leap of faith in life, I suppose. I've lived in small towns my entire life and I'm coming from the smallest town I've ever lived in, Carroll, Iowa — just over 10,000 people — to the fourth-biggest city in the country. A booming metropolitan whose watery boarder accentuates its allure. And I came here to continue my pursuit of a dream.
I want to be a prominent sportswriter in a city where it matters. Sports are king in Chicago. The greatest basketball player of all time did it here. Baseball's lovable losers play here; and they are on the brink of greatness. The hockey team is in the midst of a mini dynasty. And I'm likely only one of a couple thousand who care that there's also a professional soccer team here. This city is full of opportunity for anyone, but especially for someone in my field.
Since the first time I visited here as a middle schooler with my family, I've been intrigued by it. I came here twice in college, the second time as a senior on my fraternity's semi-formal, and that was the moment I decided I wanted to live here. I loved everything about the city, minus the unrelenting winter.
Freelancing for the Chicago Tribune won't occupy the amount of time my writing-centric life desires, so I hope to further utilize this space as a means of sharing thoughts on my journey here, but also to provide some insight and analysis on the Chicago sports scene as a I continue to entrench myself in it.
Until next time, cheers.
Saturday, March 5, 2016
The Kim Anderson Dilemma
Mizzou ended its season with a 82-72 loss to Florida on Saturday night. It was completely expected in a season that's been full of losses. The Tigers went 3-15 in the Southeastern Conference and 10-21 overall. It's one of the worst seasons in program history, yet it was better than the previous one.
Which brings us to head coach Kim Anderson, who has been at the helm for perhaps the worst two-year stretch in Mizzou basketball history. To write that is not unfair, to write it without context is. Anderson took over a program in terrible shape that became worse when the final blow of the Frank Haith era reared its ugly head midway through this season. But still, starting your career as a Division-I head coach with a 19-44 mark does little to curry favor within the athletic department or the fanbase.
New athletic director Mack Rhoads has an unenviable task ahead of him. He didn't hire Anderson. The program, by all intents and purposes, is a mess. Yet, there is smidgen of promise ahead. The Tigers had the 13th youngest team in the country and their best players are freshmen. Point guard Terrence Phillips is a gamer and will most certainly be a good player; he was three assists short of the program's first triple-double Saturday night. Fellow freshman Kevin Puryear was the team's leading scorer and only player who averaged double figures this year (holy crap that's bad). He offers the potential for a tremendous four-year player. But should Anderson be there for the ride?
From an aesthetics standpoint, Mizzou hoops the past two seasons has been something its fans have had to endure. They don't do anything that conjures up feelings of a team that is well coached. Their ball movement would make Swaggy P blush. Their outside shooting is so bad, if Mark Cuban had any vested interest in the game he'd lobby for the three-point line to be move in. And their transition defense is like watching them play a game of musical chairs. But then again, how much of that is due to the fact it is a young, relatively untalented team that is facing a better opposition almost every night?
Again, I don't envy Rhoads. Anderson is a "True Son" who was a star player for the program and assistant coach in its hay days. But this has all been a spectacular disaster. When you hire a coach in college basketball, for me, the minimum is four years. By that time, no matter the hiring circumstances, his first recruiting class has gone through the program or is entering their senior year. The coach's imprint is firmly there. At a place like Mizzou, that should mean an NCAA tourney bid at the very least.
If you were to give Anderson a third year, it would come with the caveat that the team has to be playing in some kind of postseason tournament beyond the SEC Tournament to bring him back for a fourth season. If that weren't attained, then it Rhoads could move on from Anderson with very little controversy.
But, the matter at hand is this season. To me, there's only one reason you fire Anderson. And that is to bring in Lorenzo Romar. I do not believe Romar is a great coach; he might be running out of time at his current spot in Washington. But Romar possesses one key element that is prudent to Mizzou basketball. He is the Godfather of perhaps the most important recruit in the program's history in Michael Porter Jr.
Porter, one of the top players in the 2017 class, has no reason to consider Mizzou other than the fact he's from Columbia. However, there's much more there. His aunt is Robin Pingeton, the Mizzou women's coach. His dad is an assistant to her. His two sisters play for her. His family is tight-knit and I'm sure he'd love nothing more than a reason to stay home.
But Mizzou hasn't offered it. The Tigers are really bad, and for a kid who is a sure-fire one-and-done, lottery pick, he's not going to offer his brief services to a lost cause. Porter is already considering Washington because Romar is his Godfather. Have his Godfather be the next coach of Mizzou, it might be a lock that you get a transcendent talent, albeit for just one season. But the ripple effect of that is huge, considering Porter is just a junior now. Other big-name recruits, namely Trae Young, could follow. And Porter's talented younger brother is already committed to Romar and Washington. It's the type of move, just by sheer virtuosity, could change the landscape of Mizzou hoops in an instant.
If Romar is not the guy, or if it doesn't work out, however, then there is no move to make. Mizzou is an undesirable job at the moment. It's a place that's lacked stability for sometime now. Maybe Anderson isn't the guy, but the program owes it to itself to find out if that's the case.
One more year, however miserable it might turn out to be, is the move. If Anderson fails, then Rhoads needs to open up the check book and make a splash hire and no-one would begrudge him for being too hasty.
Rhoads, however, could have other ideas.
Which brings us to head coach Kim Anderson, who has been at the helm for perhaps the worst two-year stretch in Mizzou basketball history. To write that is not unfair, to write it without context is. Anderson took over a program in terrible shape that became worse when the final blow of the Frank Haith era reared its ugly head midway through this season. But still, starting your career as a Division-I head coach with a 19-44 mark does little to curry favor within the athletic department or the fanbase.
New athletic director Mack Rhoads has an unenviable task ahead of him. He didn't hire Anderson. The program, by all intents and purposes, is a mess. Yet, there is smidgen of promise ahead. The Tigers had the 13th youngest team in the country and their best players are freshmen. Point guard Terrence Phillips is a gamer and will most certainly be a good player; he was three assists short of the program's first triple-double Saturday night. Fellow freshman Kevin Puryear was the team's leading scorer and only player who averaged double figures this year (holy crap that's bad). He offers the potential for a tremendous four-year player. But should Anderson be there for the ride?
From an aesthetics standpoint, Mizzou hoops the past two seasons has been something its fans have had to endure. They don't do anything that conjures up feelings of a team that is well coached. Their ball movement would make Swaggy P blush. Their outside shooting is so bad, if Mark Cuban had any vested interest in the game he'd lobby for the three-point line to be move in. And their transition defense is like watching them play a game of musical chairs. But then again, how much of that is due to the fact it is a young, relatively untalented team that is facing a better opposition almost every night?
Again, I don't envy Rhoads. Anderson is a "True Son" who was a star player for the program and assistant coach in its hay days. But this has all been a spectacular disaster. When you hire a coach in college basketball, for me, the minimum is four years. By that time, no matter the hiring circumstances, his first recruiting class has gone through the program or is entering their senior year. The coach's imprint is firmly there. At a place like Mizzou, that should mean an NCAA tourney bid at the very least.
If you were to give Anderson a third year, it would come with the caveat that the team has to be playing in some kind of postseason tournament beyond the SEC Tournament to bring him back for a fourth season. If that weren't attained, then it Rhoads could move on from Anderson with very little controversy.
But, the matter at hand is this season. To me, there's only one reason you fire Anderson. And that is to bring in Lorenzo Romar. I do not believe Romar is a great coach; he might be running out of time at his current spot in Washington. But Romar possesses one key element that is prudent to Mizzou basketball. He is the Godfather of perhaps the most important recruit in the program's history in Michael Porter Jr.
Porter, one of the top players in the 2017 class, has no reason to consider Mizzou other than the fact he's from Columbia. However, there's much more there. His aunt is Robin Pingeton, the Mizzou women's coach. His dad is an assistant to her. His two sisters play for her. His family is tight-knit and I'm sure he'd love nothing more than a reason to stay home.
But Mizzou hasn't offered it. The Tigers are really bad, and for a kid who is a sure-fire one-and-done, lottery pick, he's not going to offer his brief services to a lost cause. Porter is already considering Washington because Romar is his Godfather. Have his Godfather be the next coach of Mizzou, it might be a lock that you get a transcendent talent, albeit for just one season. But the ripple effect of that is huge, considering Porter is just a junior now. Other big-name recruits, namely Trae Young, could follow. And Porter's talented younger brother is already committed to Romar and Washington. It's the type of move, just by sheer virtuosity, could change the landscape of Mizzou hoops in an instant.
If Romar is not the guy, or if it doesn't work out, however, then there is no move to make. Mizzou is an undesirable job at the moment. It's a place that's lacked stability for sometime now. Maybe Anderson isn't the guy, but the program owes it to itself to find out if that's the case.
One more year, however miserable it might turn out to be, is the move. If Anderson fails, then Rhoads needs to open up the check book and make a splash hire and no-one would begrudge him for being too hasty.
Rhoads, however, could have other ideas.
Tuesday, July 28, 2015
Royals going for it all with Cueto trade
The Kansas City Royals acquired a much-needed asset in frontline starting pitcher Johnny Cueto from the Cincinnati Reds on Sunday. It's a boon to the Royals' chances to repeat at American League champions and win their first World Series since 1985.
However, in the modern landscape of Major League Baseball, the more prudent question in deals such as these seems to be, who did you give up? In this particular deal, the Royals gave up a trio of left-handed pitchers in 24-year old John Lamb, 22-year old Brandon Finnegan and 22-year old Cody Reed. Lamb, as of now, is the key piece to the deal as he's posted dazzling numbers in AAA in what has been a rejuvenating year for him as a prospect after a UCL tear and the subsequent Tommy John surgery that followed railroaded his status as a top-flight prospect. He's the most ready of the three to slot into a big-league rotation. Finnegan will forever go down in Royals lore for his incredible postseason performance, most notably his 2 1/3 innings of relief in the Wild Card game against the A's. However, it's murky whether or not he projects as a valuable starting pitcher, as he has yet to be used as anything other than a reliever in the pros. Reed is considered the player with the most upside here. He was promoted to AA-Northwest Arkansas after a stellar couple months in High-A Wilmington. Though, it's well documented that Wilmington is a pitcher's haven and many Royals prospects — some good, some bad — have had ogles of success there.
It's a decent haul for the Reds and it's my opinion that both teams make out well here.
I find myself amazed nowadays though how so much of the conversation surrounding these deals is rife with trepidation from analysts and fans about giving up "too much" in the way of prospects. As is the case in many walks of life, which sports is just as proved to, there's been an overcorrection in the way we value prospects.
As recent as fifteen years ago it was commonplace for front offices to make trades for established players without regard for the prospects in which it was giving up. Just shipping away loads of potentially valuable future pieces for a rental. Sabermetricians and forward thinking baseball folks rightfully criticized these moves at the time, but they were mostly on an island, as very few fans placed high value on their team's farm system. There's more data than ever now and front offices are much smarter in the way they operate, thus the mainstream media is much smarter in the way they evaluate and in turn the fans are much more educated in the way they react.
This is why I was inundated by friends and overwhelmed while perusing social media at the amount of Royals fans who were terrified they gave away too much for Cueto. One friend listed the possibility that Lamb, Finnegan and Reed could "all be pretty good pitchers." The Reds wouldn't have made the trade if they didn't think that was a possibility as well.
Seemingly every trade nowadays has to be won or lost, which is why the knee-jerk reaction from fans seems to accompany every trade involving prospects. Prospects have become such a delicacy that people often forget how frequently they flop. You can't build a team solely off of prospects, because prospects, especially pitching prospects, will break your heart. Break. Your. Heart. The Royals have as much experience as any in this department. So their seeming departure from coveting them as potential building blocks to stockpiling and using them as trade pieces to acquire top-level talent to add to a championship-caliber team has been refreshing.
The bottom line is this: The Royals acquired one of the best pitchers in baseball and did so without surrendering any of their perceived top three prospects. They addressed what is, really, their only weakness to this point of the season in the starting rotation. They did not need Cueto to make the playoffs, or really even to win the AL Central, which they now lead by eight games (largest lead since 1980). But they did need him to bolster their chances to win a championship.
Anyone regretting the "The Trade" back in 2013 that netted James Shields and Wade Davis — two key pieces on a team that brought KC its first playoff appearance since 1985 and within one game (one base) of a World Series title? And if Cueto helps pitch the Royals to a title this year no one will or should care what becomes of Lamb, Finnegan and Reed.
Flags fly forever. And Dayton Moore struck while the iron was piping hot. For that, he should be lauded.
However, in the modern landscape of Major League Baseball, the more prudent question in deals such as these seems to be, who did you give up? In this particular deal, the Royals gave up a trio of left-handed pitchers in 24-year old John Lamb, 22-year old Brandon Finnegan and 22-year old Cody Reed. Lamb, as of now, is the key piece to the deal as he's posted dazzling numbers in AAA in what has been a rejuvenating year for him as a prospect after a UCL tear and the subsequent Tommy John surgery that followed railroaded his status as a top-flight prospect. He's the most ready of the three to slot into a big-league rotation. Finnegan will forever go down in Royals lore for his incredible postseason performance, most notably his 2 1/3 innings of relief in the Wild Card game against the A's. However, it's murky whether or not he projects as a valuable starting pitcher, as he has yet to be used as anything other than a reliever in the pros. Reed is considered the player with the most upside here. He was promoted to AA-Northwest Arkansas after a stellar couple months in High-A Wilmington. Though, it's well documented that Wilmington is a pitcher's haven and many Royals prospects — some good, some bad — have had ogles of success there.
It's a decent haul for the Reds and it's my opinion that both teams make out well here.
I find myself amazed nowadays though how so much of the conversation surrounding these deals is rife with trepidation from analysts and fans about giving up "too much" in the way of prospects. As is the case in many walks of life, which sports is just as proved to, there's been an overcorrection in the way we value prospects.
As recent as fifteen years ago it was commonplace for front offices to make trades for established players without regard for the prospects in which it was giving up. Just shipping away loads of potentially valuable future pieces for a rental. Sabermetricians and forward thinking baseball folks rightfully criticized these moves at the time, but they were mostly on an island, as very few fans placed high value on their team's farm system. There's more data than ever now and front offices are much smarter in the way they operate, thus the mainstream media is much smarter in the way they evaluate and in turn the fans are much more educated in the way they react.
This is why I was inundated by friends and overwhelmed while perusing social media at the amount of Royals fans who were terrified they gave away too much for Cueto. One friend listed the possibility that Lamb, Finnegan and Reed could "all be pretty good pitchers." The Reds wouldn't have made the trade if they didn't think that was a possibility as well.
Seemingly every trade nowadays has to be won or lost, which is why the knee-jerk reaction from fans seems to accompany every trade involving prospects. Prospects have become such a delicacy that people often forget how frequently they flop. You can't build a team solely off of prospects, because prospects, especially pitching prospects, will break your heart. Break. Your. Heart. The Royals have as much experience as any in this department. So their seeming departure from coveting them as potential building blocks to stockpiling and using them as trade pieces to acquire top-level talent to add to a championship-caliber team has been refreshing.
The bottom line is this: The Royals acquired one of the best pitchers in baseball and did so without surrendering any of their perceived top three prospects. They addressed what is, really, their only weakness to this point of the season in the starting rotation. They did not need Cueto to make the playoffs, or really even to win the AL Central, which they now lead by eight games (largest lead since 1980). But they did need him to bolster their chances to win a championship.
Anyone regretting the "The Trade" back in 2013 that netted James Shields and Wade Davis — two key pieces on a team that brought KC its first playoff appearance since 1985 and within one game (one base) of a World Series title? And if Cueto helps pitch the Royals to a title this year no one will or should care what becomes of Lamb, Finnegan and Reed.
Flags fly forever. And Dayton Moore struck while the iron was piping hot. For that, he should be lauded.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)