Seven games into Kim Anderson's third season as the Missouri men's basketball coach, the Tigers have done little to quiet the masses concerning Anderson's job security. The team is 4-3 and suffered a particularly embarrassing non-conference loss at home to North Carolina Central — a common occurrence for Anderson's teams.
The Tigers were also handled by Davidson in their second game of the Tire Pros Invitational, less than 24 hours after they nearly upset No. 11 Xavier, a game they quite clearly could have and should have won. Mizzou avoided another bad loss on Saturday by escaping with a three-point win over Western Kentucky, pushing it above .500.
It's fair to question if Anderson is the right man for this job. And it always has been fair. He has zero experience as a Division-I head coach.
It's also fair to point out what a mess he inherited thanks to the Frank Haith hurricane that is poised to continue its torrid and destructive path, improbably, throughout the college basketball landscape. Year three, usually, is a pivotal year for a head coach. It's when his first recruiting class has reached their junior season and a clear foundation and direction for the program should be laid out. By year three, you usually have a good idea of what you have in a coach.
To me, however, that has never applied to Anderson. He inherited a program that had been stockpiled with transfers and academically and behaviorally problematic players. In his first year he did well to hold onto a pair of four-star talents Haith recruited in Jakeenan Gant and Namon Wright and added another four star in Teki-Gill Ceaser. NCAA sanctions then came down midway through his first season for violations that occurred under Haith. Coupled with increasing APR concerns and overall awful play on the court, a complete gutting of the roster was not only necessary, but a foregone conclusion.
Thus, Anderson started completely from scratch in year two. His first real recruiting class was somewhat underwhelming on paper but possessed some decent building blocks in point guard Terrence Phillips, forward Kevin Puryear, shooting guard Cullen VanLeer and combo guard K.J. Walton. Due to the roster gutting alluded to above, the Tigers were without their leading scorer and most experienced player last season in Jonathan Williams III, who elected to transfer to Gonzaga, as he no doubt felt the onus of playmaking for a bad team lying squarely on his shoulders.
With just one senior in Ryan Rosburg, arguably one of the least impactful four-year players to ever come through Columbia, and a team full of freshmen needing to play important minutes, Mizzou limped to a 10-21 season.
And, again, with growing APR concerns and miscellaneous reasons still unknown, Wright, Gant and fellow sophomores Tremaine Isabell and Deangelo Allen all transferred at the end of the season. And thanks to junior Wes Clark electing to not attend class, leading to his dismissal, Mizzou entered this season with zero players remaining from the Haith era, just two years after he left.
It's an excuse all Mizzou fans are tired of hearing, but it remains true: it is a very young team, the youngest in the country. In fact, outside of JUCO transfer Russell Woods, a senior, the Tigers are entirely made up of freshmen and sophomores. None of whom are blue chippers.
That can be labeled as an excuse, but it's also a legitimate reason as to why there appears to be little progress in Anderson's third season. If you're a Mizzou fan and entered this season believing the team needed to come close to making the NCAA Tournament and playing in some sort of postseason such as the NIT, then you had Anderson fired before the year began. It's not a realistic goal for this team at this time.
For me, Mizzou needs to hover around the .500 mark for its overall record, which likely means going 8-10 or 7-11 in the SEC. That is an attainable goal and one that would qualify as progress for this program. And it **should** be enough to convince new AD Jim Sterk that Anderson deserves a fourth season.
Many will scoff at that notion, but the reasoning behind it is rooted in big-picture thinking. Do I believe Anderson is a great coach? Hell no. There are plenty of things to not like about his in-game coaching, particularly his usage of certain players and his inability to consistently find cohesive lineups conducive to success. VanLeer, who is the Tigers ninth or tenth most efficient player, continues to lead the team in minutes. He is treating an average role player, whose job should be coming off the bench for 10-15 minutes a game and knocking down a couple threes and making some hustle plays, like the team's best player. It is a massive coaching blunder and one that could have made the difference in the loss against NCCU or Xavier in which VanLeer played 30-plus minutes, had, say, KJ Walton, the team's most capable scorer, received those minutes.
There's plenty not to like. But this program, more than ever, desperately needs some stability. There are some interesting pieces on this team, to be sure, and they appear to genuinely care about playing for Mizzou and turning it around. A lack of effort is not the issue and hasn't been in a single game this season. That wasn't the case the past three or four seasons. They appear to enjoy playing with each other, which could lead toward some quality chemistry going forward. That's a credit to Anderson.
This is a program that is struggling to draw 5,000 people at Mizzou Arena, which is one of the nicest home venues in college basketball. The product on the court is obviously the most direct reason for this. But another element is that over the past few years the casual fan could not name three players on the team. There's very little connection between team and fan base. Another coaching change after this season will most likely lead to a massive overhaul in the roster. It then adds another three years to the rebuilding process and that's assuming you get the "right guy." That would be five coaches in the 16 years since legendary coach Norm Stewart retired. It's hard to establish a culture and feel a connection between team and fan base with that level of instability.
It could be a very intriguing squad assuming everyone returns next season and lack of experience will no longer be a crutch for poor performance. You also would have a clear idea of what you have in Anderson as a head coach, as he will have been given an appropriate amount of time to turn things around. If next season doesn't bring any postseason play and yields more of the same results, then you move on.
But this season, barring another 10 or 11-win disaster, should not close the book on the Anderson era.
Monday, December 5, 2016
Tuesday, October 11, 2016
Offseason Decisions
The 2016 MLB postseason is underway and for the first time since 2013, the Royals are not apart of it. Lame, right?
There's a myriad of reasons as to why that's the case, injuries chief among them. However, the Royals simply weren't good in almost all the areas they were the year before. The offense took a step back, scoring 49 less runs. The run prevention was also much worse, allowing 71 more runs. The bullpen was worse, the defense was much worse and the starting pitching, minus the emergence of Danny Duffy, was also worse.
So, after an 81-81 season and a roster full of players who will be free agents in 2017, the Royals enter the offseason with plenty of questions. Further complicating matters, GM Dayton Moore said in his end-of-season press conference that the team would likely be looking to cut payroll from the record $137-million mark it was at this season.
Given the state of the franchise, I don't see how they can reasonably expect to compete for a championship, which is the stated goal, while also cutting payroll. A rough estimate of arbitration figures among the current roster puts the Royals at $152 million. The Royals can trim $7.6 million from that by non-tendering Dillon Gee ($3.6M), Tim Collins ($1.5M), Daniel Nava ($1.5M) and Tony Cruz ($1.0M).
It's hard to imagine the team doesn't pick up the $10 million club option on Wade Davis or the $6.5 million club option on Alcides Escobar. So factoring in the non-tenders, the Royals' payroll would be around $144 million, assuming no moves at all. No moves at all would be bad. The Royals need starting pitching and likely another bat or two, as alluded to above.
This is where Moore and the front office can get bold and creative. The No. 1 priority this offseason should be signing Duffy to a multi-year extension. After that, it should be trading Davis.
It's hard to project the market for Davis, but there is always demand for top-flight relievers (Brian Sabean on line one) and if the price is anywhere near what was paid for Aroldis Chapman and Andrew Miller at the trade deadline this season, the Royals would be wise to make the move.
Davis has been a huge part of this franchise the past few seasons and is unquestionably one of the biggest reasons the team won back-to-back AL pennants and a World Series. But relievers, no matter how good, almost always have an expiration date. Moore's best attribute thus far as a GM has been his ability to build a bullpen with mostly cheap labor. Which is what made the signing of Joakim Soria (3 years-$24M) so perplexing. The less money a small-market team like the Royals spend on a bullpen the better. It allows them to allocate more resources to starting pitching and positional players, which have a greater impact on success.
Davis is great. But, despite putting up good numbers again in 2016 (1.87 ERA) his peripherals have declined. His strikeout rate has dropped steadily from his ridiculous 13.63 K/9 mark in 2014 all the way to 9.76 K/9 this year. He also walked 3.32 batters per nine, which is a considerable increase from the past two seasons. Never a good recipe. His value isn't at its peak, but it remains high. And the Royals' bullpen remained effective when Davis went down with an injury this season — oh yeah, he also hasn't been a model of health of late either. One way to cut payroll and allow spending on other needs while also potentially boosting the farm system for big-league success beyond 2017, is trading Davis.
The second move I would like to see Moore make is even more unlikely, but even more necessary. The Royals should decline the $6.5 million team option on Escobar.
Escobar has been a staple of the Royals' revival the past 5-6 seasons, shoring up the middle with fantastic defense since he came over in the Zack Grienke trade in 2011. He, however, is currently one of the worst hitters in baseball. Despite hitting a career-high seven home runs this season thanks to an end-of-the year surge, he posted a .642 OPS. His defense, while still above average, has also taken a noticeable step back and the metrics back that up. His baserunning, the one redeeming offensive quality he possesses, was also pedestrian this past year. Such is the reality of an aging middle infielder.
The Royals are clearly high on Raul Mondesi Jr., even if his play hasn't dictated the amount of admiration he appears to garner within the organization. He spent the second half of the season playing second base and while his defense looked good, he was completely overmatched at the plate. Had Mondesi impressed more, this might not even be a conversation. But since he struggled so mightily, it's unlikely the Royals would feel comfortable handing the shortstop job to the 21-year old in what is a critical season for the franchise.
I believe that is exactly what they should do though. Word has come out of the front office that they view Mondesi as their Francisco Lindor. It's hard to see him being that good, but there's definitely some merit to it given his reputation with the glove, switch-hitting ability and surprising power. My plea to the Royals would be this: If you believe in Mondesi to that extent, enough to push him through each level so rapidly, despite the production never necessarily matching the reputation, then why not persist with that strategy? Escobar was essentially a replacement-level shortstop this season. He is 30 years old and has no upside left in him. Can't Mondesi be at least that, with the potential to surprise and be much more?
I think the $6.5 million the Royals save is worth the risk and frees up even more money for other needs on the team if necessary. It also allows Cheslor Cuthbert, who had a solid rookie season filling in for Mike Moustakas at third base, to slide over to second base.
The main concern with both of these moves, especially with this organization, is how it will effect team chemistry. Escobar is certainly a beloved member of this core group, as is Davis. Parting with both in what is presumably the final year all these players will be together could ruffle some feathers in the club house. You know what cures those hurt feelings, though? Winning.
That, above all, has to be the priority. A couple unpopular moves are often required to win championships or to sustain success. And while it would be great if the same core group could continue on winning 90-plus games a year en route to titles, that's not reality.
Standing pat is not an option. Hopefully Moore and his brain trust recognize this.
There's a myriad of reasons as to why that's the case, injuries chief among them. However, the Royals simply weren't good in almost all the areas they were the year before. The offense took a step back, scoring 49 less runs. The run prevention was also much worse, allowing 71 more runs. The bullpen was worse, the defense was much worse and the starting pitching, minus the emergence of Danny Duffy, was also worse.
So, after an 81-81 season and a roster full of players who will be free agents in 2017, the Royals enter the offseason with plenty of questions. Further complicating matters, GM Dayton Moore said in his end-of-season press conference that the team would likely be looking to cut payroll from the record $137-million mark it was at this season.
Given the state of the franchise, I don't see how they can reasonably expect to compete for a championship, which is the stated goal, while also cutting payroll. A rough estimate of arbitration figures among the current roster puts the Royals at $152 million. The Royals can trim $7.6 million from that by non-tendering Dillon Gee ($3.6M), Tim Collins ($1.5M), Daniel Nava ($1.5M) and Tony Cruz ($1.0M).
It's hard to imagine the team doesn't pick up the $10 million club option on Wade Davis or the $6.5 million club option on Alcides Escobar. So factoring in the non-tenders, the Royals' payroll would be around $144 million, assuming no moves at all. No moves at all would be bad. The Royals need starting pitching and likely another bat or two, as alluded to above.
This is where Moore and the front office can get bold and creative. The No. 1 priority this offseason should be signing Duffy to a multi-year extension. After that, it should be trading Davis.
It's hard to project the market for Davis, but there is always demand for top-flight relievers (Brian Sabean on line one) and if the price is anywhere near what was paid for Aroldis Chapman and Andrew Miller at the trade deadline this season, the Royals would be wise to make the move.
Davis has been a huge part of this franchise the past few seasons and is unquestionably one of the biggest reasons the team won back-to-back AL pennants and a World Series. But relievers, no matter how good, almost always have an expiration date. Moore's best attribute thus far as a GM has been his ability to build a bullpen with mostly cheap labor. Which is what made the signing of Joakim Soria (3 years-$24M) so perplexing. The less money a small-market team like the Royals spend on a bullpen the better. It allows them to allocate more resources to starting pitching and positional players, which have a greater impact on success.
Davis is great. But, despite putting up good numbers again in 2016 (1.87 ERA) his peripherals have declined. His strikeout rate has dropped steadily from his ridiculous 13.63 K/9 mark in 2014 all the way to 9.76 K/9 this year. He also walked 3.32 batters per nine, which is a considerable increase from the past two seasons. Never a good recipe. His value isn't at its peak, but it remains high. And the Royals' bullpen remained effective when Davis went down with an injury this season — oh yeah, he also hasn't been a model of health of late either. One way to cut payroll and allow spending on other needs while also potentially boosting the farm system for big-league success beyond 2017, is trading Davis.
The second move I would like to see Moore make is even more unlikely, but even more necessary. The Royals should decline the $6.5 million team option on Escobar.
Escobar has been a staple of the Royals' revival the past 5-6 seasons, shoring up the middle with fantastic defense since he came over in the Zack Grienke trade in 2011. He, however, is currently one of the worst hitters in baseball. Despite hitting a career-high seven home runs this season thanks to an end-of-the year surge, he posted a .642 OPS. His defense, while still above average, has also taken a noticeable step back and the metrics back that up. His baserunning, the one redeeming offensive quality he possesses, was also pedestrian this past year. Such is the reality of an aging middle infielder.
The Royals are clearly high on Raul Mondesi Jr., even if his play hasn't dictated the amount of admiration he appears to garner within the organization. He spent the second half of the season playing second base and while his defense looked good, he was completely overmatched at the plate. Had Mondesi impressed more, this might not even be a conversation. But since he struggled so mightily, it's unlikely the Royals would feel comfortable handing the shortstop job to the 21-year old in what is a critical season for the franchise.
I believe that is exactly what they should do though. Word has come out of the front office that they view Mondesi as their Francisco Lindor. It's hard to see him being that good, but there's definitely some merit to it given his reputation with the glove, switch-hitting ability and surprising power. My plea to the Royals would be this: If you believe in Mondesi to that extent, enough to push him through each level so rapidly, despite the production never necessarily matching the reputation, then why not persist with that strategy? Escobar was essentially a replacement-level shortstop this season. He is 30 years old and has no upside left in him. Can't Mondesi be at least that, with the potential to surprise and be much more?
I think the $6.5 million the Royals save is worth the risk and frees up even more money for other needs on the team if necessary. It also allows Cheslor Cuthbert, who had a solid rookie season filling in for Mike Moustakas at third base, to slide over to second base.
The main concern with both of these moves, especially with this organization, is how it will effect team chemistry. Escobar is certainly a beloved member of this core group, as is Davis. Parting with both in what is presumably the final year all these players will be together could ruffle some feathers in the club house. You know what cures those hurt feelings, though? Winning.
That, above all, has to be the priority. A couple unpopular moves are often required to win championships or to sustain success. And while it would be great if the same core group could continue on winning 90-plus games a year en route to titles, that's not reality.
Standing pat is not an option. Hopefully Moore and his brain trust recognize this.
Tuesday, April 12, 2016
The Royals Lineup Game
As the Kansas City Royals returned to action this past weekend against the Twins after a peculiar two-games-in-five-days start to the season, I'd like to delve into the age-old game of critiquing Ned Yost's lineup. Pardon me, that's World Series Champion Manager Ned Yost.
It's true, criticizing anything about the Royals these days seems a bit like malpractice, given the overwhelming success the organization has had the past two seasons. However, that doesn't mean they are beyond reproach. Yost especially.
The seasoned manager has done some things I've really liked over the past couple years and I think he's really grown into the role. He's adapted, especially in the postseason, the way he goes about his decision-making process in many regards. Though history will forget his numerous errors and recognize him as the guy who helped transform baseball's doormat into a model franchise of sorts. But the entire Royals fan base had him fired midway through the 2014 Wild Card game and, perhaps, for justifiable reasons.
Yost has never been particularly adept at the skill of in-game managing, but he's always been revered for his ability to mold together a club house and it's hard to argue his style hasn't been beneficial to this team. But, that's neither here nor there.
I'm here to assess his 2016 linuep. Which, for now, is as follows:
1) Alcides Escobar
2) Mike Moustakas
3) Lorenzo Cain
4) Eric Hosmer
5) Kendrys Morales
6) Alex Gordon
7) Sal Perez
8) Omar Infante
9) Raymond Fuentes
This is the second year in a row that Yost has convinced himself Escobar is a different hitter at the top of the order. And that belief is rooted in Escobar's postseason success at the leadoff spot, which is real, as he hit .329/.347/.514 in last year's playoffs, including a .478/.481/.652 line against Toronto which earned him ALCS MVP. But it's also an extremely small sample size. Without getting off track too much and dissecting the imposible theory of whether certain players are more "clutch" than others, it's certainly not disputable that Escobar has been a much better hitter in the postesason than in the regular season where he is a career .300 OBP guy.
That sort of thing can be hidden in 15-20 games if a player gets hot. It can't be in a 162-game season. Escobar is 29. He is who he is at this point in his career. Over the course of a full season, the Royals are a better team if he is receiving less plate appearances than say, Alex Gordon, a career .350 OBP guy who is coming off a career-high .377 OBP season last year, yet is once again slotted in the six hole. The Royals are a better team if Gordon is receiving the 30 or so plate appearance he loses from being so far down in the lineup.
Moustakas, slotted once again in the two hole to begin the season, is also an ill-advised decision. Though it was more head-scratching last season, given the fact Moustakas was nearly a lost cause at the plate as a big leaguer, with his best season coming as a rookie in 2011 when he hit .263/.309/.367. To his credit, Moustakas, almost remarkably, completely retooled his swing and his approach at the plate to destroy the shift to the tune of .356/.420/.522 the first month of the season. He cooled off in ensuing months and eventually was relegated back to the six hole in the lineup, but he went on to post, by far, the best season of his career with a .284/.348/.470 line.
Moustakas turning into a revelation at the plate was a huge reason why the Royals were so good last season. And there are certainly more egregious choices than slotting him second in the lineup. However, it's fair to expect him to be a tick off his 2015 campaign, especially in the on-base department, given how drastic an improvement it was from his career averages where he remains a .300 OPB hitter.
The Royals' most optimal lineup, to me, looks something like this (career averages included):
1) Gordon .268/.348/.434
2) Cain .286/.336./.417
3) Hosmer .280/.337/.427
4) Morales .274/.330/.465
5) Moustakas .247/.303/.401
6) Perez .278/.306/.431
7) Colon/Infante .303/.365/.381 ... .272/.309/.388
8) Fuentes/Dyson .255/.320/.343
9) Escobar .262/.298/.344
It's minor changes, of course. And even if it operated at optimal form, it's worth maybe two wins on the season. But two wins is two wins. Despite the success the past three years, the Royals' lineup had been below average until last season. Cain has turned into a fascinating player — always a defensive gem who has suddenly found himself at the plate and turned into one of the game's best players. He is, for now, the Royals best player and hitter and should be slotted accordingly in the two hole. Gordon, one of the few anomalies on a team who strikes out so rarely, has a propensity to whiff far more often than his teammates while also drawing more walks, making him an ideal leadoff guy for this club.
Power is appropriately placed in the middle of the order while an interesting mixture rounds out the bottom third of the order with good OBP (FREE COLON) and speed resides.
This is all a moot point, however. The Royals, and Ned Yost specifically, believe they have a magic formula with Escobar leading off. And though it makes zero sense analytically, it has been conducive to success in where it matters most: in the postseason. But you have to get to the postseason in order to deploy the strategy and a better lineup construction would aid that.
As was the case last season, I fully expect the necessary changes to be made in June or July. So for now, enjoy the free-swinging spectacle to start off Royals games.
It's true, criticizing anything about the Royals these days seems a bit like malpractice, given the overwhelming success the organization has had the past two seasons. However, that doesn't mean they are beyond reproach. Yost especially.
The seasoned manager has done some things I've really liked over the past couple years and I think he's really grown into the role. He's adapted, especially in the postseason, the way he goes about his decision-making process in many regards. Though history will forget his numerous errors and recognize him as the guy who helped transform baseball's doormat into a model franchise of sorts. But the entire Royals fan base had him fired midway through the 2014 Wild Card game and, perhaps, for justifiable reasons.
Yost has never been particularly adept at the skill of in-game managing, but he's always been revered for his ability to mold together a club house and it's hard to argue his style hasn't been beneficial to this team. But, that's neither here nor there.
I'm here to assess his 2016 linuep. Which, for now, is as follows:
1) Alcides Escobar
2) Mike Moustakas
3) Lorenzo Cain
4) Eric Hosmer
5) Kendrys Morales
6) Alex Gordon
7) Sal Perez
8) Omar Infante
9) Raymond Fuentes
This is the second year in a row that Yost has convinced himself Escobar is a different hitter at the top of the order. And that belief is rooted in Escobar's postseason success at the leadoff spot, which is real, as he hit .329/.347/.514 in last year's playoffs, including a .478/.481/.652 line against Toronto which earned him ALCS MVP. But it's also an extremely small sample size. Without getting off track too much and dissecting the imposible theory of whether certain players are more "clutch" than others, it's certainly not disputable that Escobar has been a much better hitter in the postesason than in the regular season where he is a career .300 OBP guy.
That sort of thing can be hidden in 15-20 games if a player gets hot. It can't be in a 162-game season. Escobar is 29. He is who he is at this point in his career. Over the course of a full season, the Royals are a better team if he is receiving less plate appearances than say, Alex Gordon, a career .350 OBP guy who is coming off a career-high .377 OBP season last year, yet is once again slotted in the six hole. The Royals are a better team if Gordon is receiving the 30 or so plate appearance he loses from being so far down in the lineup.
Moustakas, slotted once again in the two hole to begin the season, is also an ill-advised decision. Though it was more head-scratching last season, given the fact Moustakas was nearly a lost cause at the plate as a big leaguer, with his best season coming as a rookie in 2011 when he hit .263/.309/.367. To his credit, Moustakas, almost remarkably, completely retooled his swing and his approach at the plate to destroy the shift to the tune of .356/.420/.522 the first month of the season. He cooled off in ensuing months and eventually was relegated back to the six hole in the lineup, but he went on to post, by far, the best season of his career with a .284/.348/.470 line.
Moustakas turning into a revelation at the plate was a huge reason why the Royals were so good last season. And there are certainly more egregious choices than slotting him second in the lineup. However, it's fair to expect him to be a tick off his 2015 campaign, especially in the on-base department, given how drastic an improvement it was from his career averages where he remains a .300 OPB hitter.
The Royals' most optimal lineup, to me, looks something like this (career averages included):
1) Gordon .268/.348/.434
2) Cain .286/.336./.417
3) Hosmer .280/.337/.427
4) Morales .274/.330/.465
5) Moustakas .247/.303/.401
6) Perez .278/.306/.431
7) Colon/Infante .303/.365/.381 ... .272/.309/.388
8) Fuentes/Dyson .255/.320/.343
9) Escobar .262/.298/.344
It's minor changes, of course. And even if it operated at optimal form, it's worth maybe two wins on the season. But two wins is two wins. Despite the success the past three years, the Royals' lineup had been below average until last season. Cain has turned into a fascinating player — always a defensive gem who has suddenly found himself at the plate and turned into one of the game's best players. He is, for now, the Royals best player and hitter and should be slotted accordingly in the two hole. Gordon, one of the few anomalies on a team who strikes out so rarely, has a propensity to whiff far more often than his teammates while also drawing more walks, making him an ideal leadoff guy for this club.
Power is appropriately placed in the middle of the order while an interesting mixture rounds out the bottom third of the order with good OBP (FREE COLON) and speed resides.
This is all a moot point, however. The Royals, and Ned Yost specifically, believe they have a magic formula with Escobar leading off. And though it makes zero sense analytically, it has been conducive to success in where it matters most: in the postseason. But you have to get to the postseason in order to deploy the strategy and a better lineup construction would aid that.
As was the case last season, I fully expect the necessary changes to be made in June or July. So for now, enjoy the free-swinging spectacle to start off Royals games.
Thursday, April 7, 2016
Grand Missteps: Daryl Morey and the Rockets
After Wednesday's narrow defeat at Dallas the Houston Rockets are a full game out of the eighth and final playoff spot in the Western Conference. The 88-86 loss to the Mavericks was the latest disappointment in a season that's been full of them. The Rockets (38-40) trail the Utah Jazz (39-39) by a game in the standings with four left to play.
They have more than a puncher's chance to sneak in to the final slot, with their final four games against cellar dwellers in the Suns, Lakers, Timberwolves and Kings, while the Jazz and Mavericks square off against each other in the penultimate game of the season. The Jazz also host the Clippers and have a road test at Denver.
All of that, however, is backdrop, while larger questiond about this Rockets' season loom, including: what happened? This is virtually the same team that went 56-26 last season and reached the conference finals. To go from that to this — a dysfunctional group of misfit toys on the brink of missing the postseason in a year where the Western Conference is as mediocre as its been in a decade — is perplexing.
On the surface, James Harden has followed up the best season of his career with an equally impressive 2015-16 campaign. The numbers (28.6 ppg., 7.5 apg., 6.3 rpg.) are actually up from last year and his 25.05 PER (Player Efficiency Rating), is just a tick off his 26.76 pace last year. However, if you've watched the Rockets this season, you know that's not close to true. Harden's played great the second half of the season, but it was what he did the first few weeks of the season that set the tone for this year. He was in the news during the offseason for activities not related to basketball, namely, his involvement with the least-desirable Kardashian. And he showed up to camp overweight. Say what you will about his private life (though dating a Kardashian is a documented terrible idea for any athlete), but when the team's star player shows up to camp out of shape and overweight, that's never a good sign.
The Rockets, unsurprisingly, stumbled out of the gates and got off to an 4-7 start. Kevin McHale took the fall for the poor start and was fired; never mind the fact Harden was atrocious during the lackluster start to the season while he tried to play his way into shape J.B. Bickerstaff took over, to the delight of Harden, who undoubtedly played a large role in McHale's firing, and the team has more or less been the same in the 67 games that have followed.
I'm not going to use this space to try and delve into what has ailed the Rockets this year. It's really been a combination of things. Dwight Howard is no longer a premier big man in a league that has slowly gravitated away from the low-post game. His defensive prowess is mitigated when team's go to the increasingly popular small-ball lineups that includes stretch 5's, dragging him out to an uncomfortable space on the perimeter. Plus, he's not nearly the same rebounder he used to be and is almost unplayable down the stretch due to is abysmal free-throw shooting. He and Harden found glimpses of synergy last season and it resulted in some wonderful pick-and-roll combinations, which helped fuel the playoff run. But neither has been on the same page this season. Josh Smith hasn't provided the same ineffable boost this season. Terrence Jones, who at times looked like he was coming into his own as a quality power forward last season, has been a disaster this year and has seen his minutes decrease in favor of Clint Capela. Sadly, one of the main positives of the year has been the pleasant surprise of Michael Beasley on the offensive end — though he still hasn't fully grasped the evolving analytics of how stupid taking 20-foot twos are, but I digress.
None of that of course matters much. What matters is this team has been a lost cause, for this season anyway, since late January and the inability of GM Daryl Morey to realize this has set the franchise back. It was quite obvious whatever magic the team had captured last year was not going to suddenly manifest itself in 2015-16, so with Howard's impending free agency, it would've been prudent to blow it up at the trade deadline.
It's true, the Rockets wouldn't have gotten a great haul for Howard, but moving him went beyond acquiring assets. Fair or unfair, there's very little to gain for a team like the Rockets from sneaking into the eight spot of the playoffs and much to lose from finishing ninth or 10th. This is not a young team trying to mold itself into a title contender, taking baby steps along the way. In fact, it's quite the opposite. Outside of Harden, whose 26, it's an aging and declining roster that can point to who else as a young building block? Capela?
This "playoff hunt" masks the fact the Rockets face an unstable and uncertain future. Harden, under contract through 2019, has to be the star to build around. And despite how unappealing that sounds, given what's occurred this season, he is still unquestionably one of the ten best players in the league and you have to have at least one of "those guys" if you aspire to win a title. The problem, however, is the short list of players who appear to want to play with him. Morey has a proven track record of swinging for the fences in free agency. It's unclear though who he'd be able to bring in to pair alongside Harden.
Thus, the focus might have to be the draft.
Trading Howard and perhaps Ariza at the deadline would've served twofold. It brought back assets and provided a chance to see what the team looks like with Harden as the absolute focal point with perhaps some young players around him. If it didn't work out, it also quietly served as a silent tanking mechanism that would've allowed the team to sneak up the draft board to add a much-needed young building block. The Pelicans, who admittedly got off to a much worse start than the Rockets, identified the season as a lost cause at the appropriate time and have rested, err, been blessed with injuries to key cogs like Anthony Davis the final couple months of the season allowing them to vault up the draft lottery.
Morey and the Rockets would've been wise to employ the same tactic. But instead they fooled themselves into believing this core would recapture last season's form and make it into the playoffs with a real shot to make a run. That's not a strategy, it's hope. And you don't win championships based off hope. Morey, an accomplished GM with a keen eye for analytics, should know this better than anyone.
His inaction at the deadline undermined his own long-term goals for this franchise and it complicated the rebuilding efforts going forward. The Rockets will pick in the bottom part of the lottery at best where they're unlikely to find a difference maker — though Tyler Ullis is an interesting option at point guard. It's a far cry from where they were at this point last season and the fall has no doubt been swift.
Morey and Harden carry the most responsibility, thus bear the most blame. The ramifications from this year will extend well beyond next year and both are culpable in what has proven to be a disastrous season.
They have more than a puncher's chance to sneak in to the final slot, with their final four games against cellar dwellers in the Suns, Lakers, Timberwolves and Kings, while the Jazz and Mavericks square off against each other in the penultimate game of the season. The Jazz also host the Clippers and have a road test at Denver.
All of that, however, is backdrop, while larger questiond about this Rockets' season loom, including: what happened? This is virtually the same team that went 56-26 last season and reached the conference finals. To go from that to this — a dysfunctional group of misfit toys on the brink of missing the postseason in a year where the Western Conference is as mediocre as its been in a decade — is perplexing.
On the surface, James Harden has followed up the best season of his career with an equally impressive 2015-16 campaign. The numbers (28.6 ppg., 7.5 apg., 6.3 rpg.) are actually up from last year and his 25.05 PER (Player Efficiency Rating), is just a tick off his 26.76 pace last year. However, if you've watched the Rockets this season, you know that's not close to true. Harden's played great the second half of the season, but it was what he did the first few weeks of the season that set the tone for this year. He was in the news during the offseason for activities not related to basketball, namely, his involvement with the least-desirable Kardashian. And he showed up to camp overweight. Say what you will about his private life (though dating a Kardashian is a documented terrible idea for any athlete), but when the team's star player shows up to camp out of shape and overweight, that's never a good sign.
The Rockets, unsurprisingly, stumbled out of the gates and got off to an 4-7 start. Kevin McHale took the fall for the poor start and was fired; never mind the fact Harden was atrocious during the lackluster start to the season while he tried to play his way into shape J.B. Bickerstaff took over, to the delight of Harden, who undoubtedly played a large role in McHale's firing, and the team has more or less been the same in the 67 games that have followed.
I'm not going to use this space to try and delve into what has ailed the Rockets this year. It's really been a combination of things. Dwight Howard is no longer a premier big man in a league that has slowly gravitated away from the low-post game. His defensive prowess is mitigated when team's go to the increasingly popular small-ball lineups that includes stretch 5's, dragging him out to an uncomfortable space on the perimeter. Plus, he's not nearly the same rebounder he used to be and is almost unplayable down the stretch due to is abysmal free-throw shooting. He and Harden found glimpses of synergy last season and it resulted in some wonderful pick-and-roll combinations, which helped fuel the playoff run. But neither has been on the same page this season. Josh Smith hasn't provided the same ineffable boost this season. Terrence Jones, who at times looked like he was coming into his own as a quality power forward last season, has been a disaster this year and has seen his minutes decrease in favor of Clint Capela. Sadly, one of the main positives of the year has been the pleasant surprise of Michael Beasley on the offensive end — though he still hasn't fully grasped the evolving analytics of how stupid taking 20-foot twos are, but I digress.
None of that of course matters much. What matters is this team has been a lost cause, for this season anyway, since late January and the inability of GM Daryl Morey to realize this has set the franchise back. It was quite obvious whatever magic the team had captured last year was not going to suddenly manifest itself in 2015-16, so with Howard's impending free agency, it would've been prudent to blow it up at the trade deadline.
It's true, the Rockets wouldn't have gotten a great haul for Howard, but moving him went beyond acquiring assets. Fair or unfair, there's very little to gain for a team like the Rockets from sneaking into the eight spot of the playoffs and much to lose from finishing ninth or 10th. This is not a young team trying to mold itself into a title contender, taking baby steps along the way. In fact, it's quite the opposite. Outside of Harden, whose 26, it's an aging and declining roster that can point to who else as a young building block? Capela?
This "playoff hunt" masks the fact the Rockets face an unstable and uncertain future. Harden, under contract through 2019, has to be the star to build around. And despite how unappealing that sounds, given what's occurred this season, he is still unquestionably one of the ten best players in the league and you have to have at least one of "those guys" if you aspire to win a title. The problem, however, is the short list of players who appear to want to play with him. Morey has a proven track record of swinging for the fences in free agency. It's unclear though who he'd be able to bring in to pair alongside Harden.
Thus, the focus might have to be the draft.
Trading Howard and perhaps Ariza at the deadline would've served twofold. It brought back assets and provided a chance to see what the team looks like with Harden as the absolute focal point with perhaps some young players around him. If it didn't work out, it also quietly served as a silent tanking mechanism that would've allowed the team to sneak up the draft board to add a much-needed young building block. The Pelicans, who admittedly got off to a much worse start than the Rockets, identified the season as a lost cause at the appropriate time and have rested, err, been blessed with injuries to key cogs like Anthony Davis the final couple months of the season allowing them to vault up the draft lottery.
Morey and the Rockets would've been wise to employ the same tactic. But instead they fooled themselves into believing this core would recapture last season's form and make it into the playoffs with a real shot to make a run. That's not a strategy, it's hope. And you don't win championships based off hope. Morey, an accomplished GM with a keen eye for analytics, should know this better than anyone.
His inaction at the deadline undermined his own long-term goals for this franchise and it complicated the rebuilding efforts going forward. The Rockets will pick in the bottom part of the lottery at best where they're unlikely to find a difference maker — though Tyler Ullis is an interesting option at point guard. It's a far cry from where they were at this point last season and the fall has no doubt been swift.
Morey and Harden carry the most responsibility, thus bear the most blame. The ramifications from this year will extend well beyond next year and both are culpable in what has proven to be a disastrous season.
Wednesday, April 6, 2016
Sweet Home Chicago
As I gaze upon Lake Michigan from my apartment in downtown Chicago, I'm filled with insatiable ambition and also a little trepidation.
Such is the juxtaposition of emotion when taking a leap of faith in life, I suppose. I've lived in small towns my entire life and I'm coming from the smallest town I've ever lived in, Carroll, Iowa — just over 10,000 people — to the fourth-biggest city in the country. A booming metropolitan whose watery boarder accentuates its allure. And I came here to continue my pursuit of a dream.
I want to be a prominent sportswriter in a city where it matters. Sports are king in Chicago. The greatest basketball player of all time did it here. Baseball's lovable losers play here; and they are on the brink of greatness. The hockey team is in the midst of a mini dynasty. And I'm likely only one of a couple thousand who care that there's also a professional soccer team here. This city is full of opportunity for anyone, but especially for someone in my field.
Since the first time I visited here as a middle schooler with my family, I've been intrigued by it. I came here twice in college, the second time as a senior on my fraternity's semi-formal, and that was the moment I decided I wanted to live here. I loved everything about the city, minus the unrelenting winter.
Freelancing for the Chicago Tribune won't occupy the amount of time my writing-centric life desires, so I hope to further utilize this space as a means of sharing thoughts on my journey here, but also to provide some insight and analysis on the Chicago sports scene as a I continue to entrench myself in it.
Until next time, cheers.
Saturday, March 5, 2016
The Kim Anderson Dilemma
Mizzou ended its season with a 82-72 loss to Florida on Saturday night. It was completely expected in a season that's been full of losses. The Tigers went 3-15 in the Southeastern Conference and 10-21 overall. It's one of the worst seasons in program history, yet it was better than the previous one.
Which brings us to head coach Kim Anderson, who has been at the helm for perhaps the worst two-year stretch in Mizzou basketball history. To write that is not unfair, to write it without context is. Anderson took over a program in terrible shape that became worse when the final blow of the Frank Haith era reared its ugly head midway through this season. But still, starting your career as a Division-I head coach with a 19-44 mark does little to curry favor within the athletic department or the fanbase.
New athletic director Mack Rhoads has an unenviable task ahead of him. He didn't hire Anderson. The program, by all intents and purposes, is a mess. Yet, there is smidgen of promise ahead. The Tigers had the 13th youngest team in the country and their best players are freshmen. Point guard Terrence Phillips is a gamer and will most certainly be a good player; he was three assists short of the program's first triple-double Saturday night. Fellow freshman Kevin Puryear was the team's leading scorer and only player who averaged double figures this year (holy crap that's bad). He offers the potential for a tremendous four-year player. But should Anderson be there for the ride?
From an aesthetics standpoint, Mizzou hoops the past two seasons has been something its fans have had to endure. They don't do anything that conjures up feelings of a team that is well coached. Their ball movement would make Swaggy P blush. Their outside shooting is so bad, if Mark Cuban had any vested interest in the game he'd lobby for the three-point line to be move in. And their transition defense is like watching them play a game of musical chairs. But then again, how much of that is due to the fact it is a young, relatively untalented team that is facing a better opposition almost every night?
Again, I don't envy Rhoads. Anderson is a "True Son" who was a star player for the program and assistant coach in its hay days. But this has all been a spectacular disaster. When you hire a coach in college basketball, for me, the minimum is four years. By that time, no matter the hiring circumstances, his first recruiting class has gone through the program or is entering their senior year. The coach's imprint is firmly there. At a place like Mizzou, that should mean an NCAA tourney bid at the very least.
If you were to give Anderson a third year, it would come with the caveat that the team has to be playing in some kind of postseason tournament beyond the SEC Tournament to bring him back for a fourth season. If that weren't attained, then it Rhoads could move on from Anderson with very little controversy.
But, the matter at hand is this season. To me, there's only one reason you fire Anderson. And that is to bring in Lorenzo Romar. I do not believe Romar is a great coach; he might be running out of time at his current spot in Washington. But Romar possesses one key element that is prudent to Mizzou basketball. He is the Godfather of perhaps the most important recruit in the program's history in Michael Porter Jr.
Porter, one of the top players in the 2017 class, has no reason to consider Mizzou other than the fact he's from Columbia. However, there's much more there. His aunt is Robin Pingeton, the Mizzou women's coach. His dad is an assistant to her. His two sisters play for her. His family is tight-knit and I'm sure he'd love nothing more than a reason to stay home.
But Mizzou hasn't offered it. The Tigers are really bad, and for a kid who is a sure-fire one-and-done, lottery pick, he's not going to offer his brief services to a lost cause. Porter is already considering Washington because Romar is his Godfather. Have his Godfather be the next coach of Mizzou, it might be a lock that you get a transcendent talent, albeit for just one season. But the ripple effect of that is huge, considering Porter is just a junior now. Other big-name recruits, namely Trae Young, could follow. And Porter's talented younger brother is already committed to Romar and Washington. It's the type of move, just by sheer virtuosity, could change the landscape of Mizzou hoops in an instant.
If Romar is not the guy, or if it doesn't work out, however, then there is no move to make. Mizzou is an undesirable job at the moment. It's a place that's lacked stability for sometime now. Maybe Anderson isn't the guy, but the program owes it to itself to find out if that's the case.
One more year, however miserable it might turn out to be, is the move. If Anderson fails, then Rhoads needs to open up the check book and make a splash hire and no-one would begrudge him for being too hasty.
Rhoads, however, could have other ideas.
Which brings us to head coach Kim Anderson, who has been at the helm for perhaps the worst two-year stretch in Mizzou basketball history. To write that is not unfair, to write it without context is. Anderson took over a program in terrible shape that became worse when the final blow of the Frank Haith era reared its ugly head midway through this season. But still, starting your career as a Division-I head coach with a 19-44 mark does little to curry favor within the athletic department or the fanbase.
New athletic director Mack Rhoads has an unenviable task ahead of him. He didn't hire Anderson. The program, by all intents and purposes, is a mess. Yet, there is smidgen of promise ahead. The Tigers had the 13th youngest team in the country and their best players are freshmen. Point guard Terrence Phillips is a gamer and will most certainly be a good player; he was three assists short of the program's first triple-double Saturday night. Fellow freshman Kevin Puryear was the team's leading scorer and only player who averaged double figures this year (holy crap that's bad). He offers the potential for a tremendous four-year player. But should Anderson be there for the ride?
From an aesthetics standpoint, Mizzou hoops the past two seasons has been something its fans have had to endure. They don't do anything that conjures up feelings of a team that is well coached. Their ball movement would make Swaggy P blush. Their outside shooting is so bad, if Mark Cuban had any vested interest in the game he'd lobby for the three-point line to be move in. And their transition defense is like watching them play a game of musical chairs. But then again, how much of that is due to the fact it is a young, relatively untalented team that is facing a better opposition almost every night?
Again, I don't envy Rhoads. Anderson is a "True Son" who was a star player for the program and assistant coach in its hay days. But this has all been a spectacular disaster. When you hire a coach in college basketball, for me, the minimum is four years. By that time, no matter the hiring circumstances, his first recruiting class has gone through the program or is entering their senior year. The coach's imprint is firmly there. At a place like Mizzou, that should mean an NCAA tourney bid at the very least.
If you were to give Anderson a third year, it would come with the caveat that the team has to be playing in some kind of postseason tournament beyond the SEC Tournament to bring him back for a fourth season. If that weren't attained, then it Rhoads could move on from Anderson with very little controversy.
But, the matter at hand is this season. To me, there's only one reason you fire Anderson. And that is to bring in Lorenzo Romar. I do not believe Romar is a great coach; he might be running out of time at his current spot in Washington. But Romar possesses one key element that is prudent to Mizzou basketball. He is the Godfather of perhaps the most important recruit in the program's history in Michael Porter Jr.
Porter, one of the top players in the 2017 class, has no reason to consider Mizzou other than the fact he's from Columbia. However, there's much more there. His aunt is Robin Pingeton, the Mizzou women's coach. His dad is an assistant to her. His two sisters play for her. His family is tight-knit and I'm sure he'd love nothing more than a reason to stay home.
But Mizzou hasn't offered it. The Tigers are really bad, and for a kid who is a sure-fire one-and-done, lottery pick, he's not going to offer his brief services to a lost cause. Porter is already considering Washington because Romar is his Godfather. Have his Godfather be the next coach of Mizzou, it might be a lock that you get a transcendent talent, albeit for just one season. But the ripple effect of that is huge, considering Porter is just a junior now. Other big-name recruits, namely Trae Young, could follow. And Porter's talented younger brother is already committed to Romar and Washington. It's the type of move, just by sheer virtuosity, could change the landscape of Mizzou hoops in an instant.
If Romar is not the guy, or if it doesn't work out, however, then there is no move to make. Mizzou is an undesirable job at the moment. It's a place that's lacked stability for sometime now. Maybe Anderson isn't the guy, but the program owes it to itself to find out if that's the case.
One more year, however miserable it might turn out to be, is the move. If Anderson fails, then Rhoads needs to open up the check book and make a splash hire and no-one would begrudge him for being too hasty.
Rhoads, however, could have other ideas.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)